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ABSTRACT	LANDRE,	KRISTEN	K.	Acquirer	Shareholder	Value	Creation	in	United	States	Mergers	&	Acquisitions.	Department	of	Economics,	June	2017.			ADVISOR:	Professor	Kaywana	Raeburn,	Department	of	Economics,	Union	College		 Mergers	and	acquisitions	remain	the	primary	corporate	growth	strategy	for	executives	around	the	world.	While	deals	continue	to	rise	in	popularity,	their	success	in	generating	value	for	participating	firms	remain	uncertain.	A	vast	majority	of	merger	and	acquisition	research	focuses	on	this	disparity	and	considers	whether	they	create	or	destroy	value	for	stakeholders.	In	this	thesis,	I	examine	the	value	generated	to	shareholders	by	US	acquisitions	and	mergers	announced	between	2005	and	2009.	Utilizing	the	event	study	methodology,	I	evaluate	cumulative	abnormal	returns	(CAR)	for	acquiring	firms	to	analyze	the	wealth	effects	of	merger	and	acquisition	announcements.	CAR	is	a	direct	measure	of	the	change	in	shareholder	wealth	resulting	from	an	event	because	CAR	represent	the	difference	between	the	return	conditional	on	the	event	and	the	expected	return.	I	find	that	acquiring	firm	shareholders	realized	average	cumulative	abnormal	returns	of	-1.572%	during	a	five-day	event	window	centered	around	the	event	announcement,	and	-3.905%	during	a	two-month	event	window.	Furthermore,	when	distinguishing	the	characteristics	of	deals	that	impact	the	returns	to	shareholders,	transaction	value	has	a	statistically	significant	negative	correlation	with	CAR.	The	results	of	this	thesis	support	previous	literature	findings	that	the	returns	to	shareholders	of	the	acquiring	firms	are	often	not	significant	and	sometimes	negative.	
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CHAPTER	ONE	
	INTRODUCTION	
A. Background	Information		Executives	seeking	growth	for	their	firms	consider	a	multitude	of	strategies,	yet	mergers	and	acquisitions	remain	the	primary	approach	to	reach	this	goal.	Although	deals	can	be	appealing	to	help	reduce	costs,	increase	sales,	and	gain	access	to	new	technologies	or	geographic	region,	research	continues	to	suggest	the	failure	rate	is	between	70	and	90%	for	mergers	and	acquisitions	(Christensen	et	al.	2011).					Regardless	of	the	high	risk	associated	with	deals,	mergers	and	acquisitions	continue	to	grow	in	value	and	frequency.	2015	is	regarded	as	the	biggest	year	ever	for	mergers	and	acquisitions,	reaching	a	record	high	deal	value	of	$4.7	trillion	(KPMG	LLP,	2016).	According	to	KPMG’s	survey	of	550	mergers	and	acquisitions	professionals,	deals	are	expected	to	accelerate	and	continue	to	increase	in	value	and	size.	Furthermore,	the	survey	found	that	91%	of	executives	plan	to	execute	one	or	more	acquisition	in	the	next	12	months,	compared	to	82%	in	2015	(KPMG	LLP,	2016).	A	primary	reason	executives	are	selecting	mergers	and	acquisitions	as	the	predominant	growth	strategy	for	their	firms	is	the	current	economic	environment	“where	S&P	500	Earnings	Per	Share	projections	have	continued	to	decline,	demonstrating	weakening	confidence	in	organic	growth”	(KPMG	LLP,	2016,	p.16).	Respondents	to	KPMG’s	survey	also	cited	enhancing	technologies,	extending	their	geographic	reach,	entering	new	lines	of	business,	and	expanding	their	customer	base	as	motivations	for	acquisitions.				 	
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As	a	result	of	the	high-risk	nature	of	mergers	and	acquisitions,	there	are	multiple	factors	that	are	critical	to	a	deal’s	success.	Key	elements	of	a	successful	merger	or	acquisition	include	a	prompt	and	well-executed	integration	strategy,	accurate	transaction	value,	thorough	due	diligence,	and	positive	external	conditions	(Christensen	et	al.	2011	and	KPMG	LLP	2016).	Strategic	fit	serves	as	the	most	important	criterion	for	a	successful	deal,	focusing	primarily	on	ensuring	the	acquirer	and	target	company	have	compatible	business	models.	In	addition,	cultural	fit	is	important	for	long-term	success	and	integration	of	the	consolidated	companies.		Although	the	specific	motivations	for	deals	vary,	the	ultimate	goal	is	to	boost	performance	and	increase	firm	value.	It	is	important	to	consider	the	various	parties	that	can	be	affected	by	a	deal	because	not	all	parties	may	benefit	equally,	and	in	fact,	different	groups	of	stakeholders	may	simultaneously	be	inversely	impacted	from	a	merger	or	acquisition.	The	first,	and	probably	most	obvious	group	affected,	is	the	employees	of	both	companies.	While	some	employees	may	be	promoted	or	see	no	change	in	employment	status,	deals	can	also	lead	to	companies	laying	off	large	sums	of	people	due	to	a	new	technology	or	method	to	reduce	costs,	therefore	decreasing	value	to	employees.	Another	group	subject	to	a	deal’s	effects	is	the	consumers	of	the	product	or	services	offered	by	the	company.	It	may	be	assumed	that	customers	would	experience	an	increase	in	value	from	a	deal,	if	new	technologies	were	introduced	to	expand	or	improve	product	offerings,	but	it	must	also	be	considered	that	a	merger	or	acquisition	may	drive	up	prices	for	consumers,	leading	to	an	adverse	effect.	The	final	party	that	experiences	changes	in	firm	value	from	a	deal	is	the	company’s	shareholders.		Shareholders	of	companies	participating	in	deals	could	
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be	impacted	by	changes	in	share	prices	from	a	deal.	Depending	on	the	success	of	the	merger	or	acquisition,	and	the	overall	perception	of	the	deal	from	shareholders,	it	could	result	in	value	creation	or	destruction.	Theoretically,	a	rise	in	share	prices	would	lead	to	value	creation	and	a	decrease	in	share	prices	would	result	in	value	destruction	for	the	shareholders.	To	evaluate	the	influence	of	a	deal	on	company	shareholders,	the	stock	price	is	used.	Stock	price	is	an	optimal	tool	to	analyze	the	value	of	a	firm	because	it	is	theorized	that	a	stock	price	represents	the	“expected	present	value	of	future	net	cash	flows”	(Thorbecke,	1997,	p.635).	As	mentioned	above,	for	the	shareholders,	it	is	desirable	for	the	company	to	see	a	rise	in	its	stock	price	because	it	contributes	to	total	shareholder	return,	which	is	a	measure	of	the	company’s	performance	(Deelder,	Goedhart	and	Agrawal,	2008).	Share	price	appreciation	indicates	that	there	is	value	creation	for	the	firm	and	investors	feel	positively	about	the	company’s	performance	in	the	future.	This	thesis	will	specifically	focus	on	the	impact	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	on	company	shareholders	as	a	result	of	the	deal	announcement.	
B. Research	Question			Although	mergers	and	acquisitions	remain	the	primary	source	of	strategic	growth,	there	is	consistent	concern	about	whether	deals	result	in	value	creation	or	value	destruction	for	the	participating	firms	(Farinós,	Herrero	and	Latorre	2014).	It	is	important	to	continue	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	deals	to	determine	whether	mergers	and	acquisitions	are	worth	the	risk	that	is	undertaken.	This	thesis	will	focus	primarily	on	the	immediate	value	created	for	shareholders.	One	method	of	assessing	the	potential	value	creation	or	destruction	for	shareholders	that	results	
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from	a	deal	is	examining	the	participating	companies’	stock	prices.	Stock	prices	reflect	the	company’s	current	value,	but	can	also	represent	growth	over	a	given	time	period	(Investopedia.com	2014).	To	determine	the	effect	of	a	merger	or	acquisition	on	a	company’s	stock	price,	abnormal	returns	will	be	evaluated	because	they	represent	the	returns	generated	over	a	period	of	time	that	differ	from	the	expected	return.		In	order	to	further	understand	the	impact	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	on	the	participating	companies	and	their	shareholders,	this	thesis	addresses	the	following	question:	Do	acquisitions	create	or	destroy	value	for	the	shareholders	of	the	acquiring	firms?		To	answer	this	question,	a	sample	of	50	acquisitions	was	taken	from	Thomson	One’s	event	database.	The	sample	was	based	on	multiple	criteria	and	covered	the	time	period	of	2005-2015.	To	determine	the	effect	of	the	acquisition	on	the	acquiring	firm’s	shareholders,	an	event	study	was	employed	to	establish	whether	the	acquiring	company	experienced	significantly	different	returns	from	what	was	expected	for	the	specified	time	period	around	the	merger	announcement	date.	To	calculate	returns,	the	company	stock	prices	over	a	given	time	period	were	collected	for	a	sample	of	acquisitions	that	occurred	in	the	United	States	between	2005	and	2009.	Furthermore,	from	these	stock	prices	and	market	data,	expected	returns	and	actual	returns	were	calculated.	Abnormal	returns	are	constructed	by	finding	the	difference	between	the	observed	return	and	the	predicted	return.	The	abnormal	return	is	the	variance	in	the	return	conditional	on	the	acquisition	(Kothari	and	Warner,	2007).		
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Furthermore,	if	a	large	amount	of	variance	exists	within	the	returns	across	the	time	period	cumulative	abnormal	returns	can	be	calculated	by	summing	the	average	returns	over	multiple	periods	(Brooks,	2013).	In	addition	to	abnormal	returns,	a	test	statistic	can	be	calculated	off	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	to	determine	if	the	change	in	company	stock	returns	for	the	given	event	period	is	significant.		
C. Motivation	and	Significance	of	Thesis	Mergers	and	acquisitions	continue	to	serve	as	a	primary	avenue	for	companies	seeking	to	achieve	synergies	and	to	generate	added	value	to	the	organization.	Synergies	are	defined	as	the	effects	“arising	between	two	or	more	agents,	entities,	factors,	or	substances	that	produce	an	effect	greater	than	the	sum	of	their	individual	effects”	and	added	value	is	“used	in	several	ways	to	indicate	an	enhancement	to	a	product	or	an	entity”	(Eliasson,	2011,	p.1).	A	common	representation	of	this	in	mergers	and	acquisitions	is	1+1=3.	It	demonstrates	that	synergies	and	value	added	suggest	that	the	combination	of	two	firms	should	create	a	combined	effect	greater	than	the	individual	entities.		Although	deals	remain	the	prominent	means	to	attain	greater	value	for	firms	and	their	stakeholders,	failure	is	more	likely	than	success.	In	the	context	of	mergers	and	acquisitions,	success	would	be	indicated	by	value	creation	to	company	stakeholders.	It	is	important	to	actively	evaluate	the	effects	mergers	and	acquisitions	on	participating	companies	to	establish	whether	deals	should	continue	to	be	a	common	corporate	growth	strategy.			A	significant	portion	of	current	mergers	and	acquisition	literature	focuses	on	the	wealth	effects	generated	by	deals,	but	primarily	examines	the	effects	realized	by	the	
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acquired	company.	While	it	is	assumed	that	an	acquiring	company	will	experience	positive	financial	effects	as	a	result	of	an	acquisition,	it	is	important	to	determine	if	this,	in	fact,	is	true.		The	significance	of	this	thesis	is	to	assess	the	wealth	effects	of	acquisitions	on	acquiring	companies,	and	whether	those	effects	led	to	value	creation	or	destruction.	Ultimately,	this	can	lead	to	a	conclusion	as	to	whether	these	deal	were	a	productive	source	of	corporate	growth,	and	contribute	to	the	body	of	research	mergers	and	acquisitions	and	their	wealth	effects.	
D. Structure	of	Thesis	This	thesis	is	organized	into	six	chapters.	Chapter	I	is	the	introduction,	which	outlines	the	research,	provides	background	information	on	the	topic	and	identifies	the	research	question.	Chapter	II	examines	previous	research	conducted	on	mergers	and	acquisitions.	Relevant	literature	includes	a	background	on	mergers	and	acquisitions,	a	discussion	of	the	motivations	for	deals,	and	whether	deals	create	or	destroy	value	for	participating	firms.	Chapter	III	presents	the	analytical	framework	employed	for	the	thesis.	This	chapter	considers	event	study	methodology	and	how	abnormal	returns	and	cumulative	abnormal	returns	are	utilized	to	evaluate	the	effect	of	acquisitions	on	the	shareholders	of	a	company.	Chapter	IV	provides	an	in-depth	discussion	of	the	data.	This	section	discusses	the	source	of	the	data	and	summarizes	the	sample	of	acquisitions.		Chapter	V	analyzes	the	data	on	multiple	dimensions,	and	presents	the	findings.	Finally	Chapter	VI	assesses	the	findings,	and	draws	conclusions	based	on	the	research.	Furthermore,	this	section	will	evaluate	
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the	limitations	to	the	analysis,	possible	implications	of	the	findings,	and	potential	avenues	for	further	research.		
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CHAPTER	II	
LITERATURE	REVIEW	There	has	been	extensive	research	on	the	implications	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	and	its	wealth	effects.	Chapter	II	focuses	on	two	different	aspects	of	mergers	and	acquisition	literature.	First,	it	provides	background	information	on	mergers	and	acquisitions,	specifically	the	varying	motivations	for	initiating	deals,	different	potential	payment	structures,	and	characteristics	of	successful	deals.	A	discussion	of	the	various	parties	affected	by	a	deal	is	also	included.	Next,	this	section	reviews	previous	research	conducted	on	the	financial	impacts	of	deals	on	participating	companies	through	the	evaluation	of	stock	prices	and	returns.		
A. Introduction	As	a	function	of	their	rising	popularity	and	high	risk,	mergers	and	acquisitions	attract	the	interest	and	attention	of	researchers	and	executives	from	a	variety	of	backgrounds.	According	to	Cartwright	and	Schoenberg	(2006),	attention	from	a	broad	range	of	disciplines	enables	merger	and	acquisition	research	to	incorporate	the	“financial,	strategic,	behavioral,	operational	and	cross-cultural	aspects	of	this	challenging	and	high	risk	activity”	(p.	2).	The	authors	note	research	on	the	cultural	and	psychological	features	has	grown	in	recent	years,	but	the	majority	of	merger	and	acquisition	research	remains	concentrated	on	financial	and	market	studies,	focused	on	the	US	and	UK	markets.	Based	on	a	comprehensive	review	of	relevant	literature,	the	following	discussion	highlights	important	background	information	and	terms	related	to	mergers	and	acquisitions	and	findings	from	prior	research	on	the	wealth	effects	from	deals. 
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B. Background	Information	on	Mergers	and	Acquisitions	 Mergers	and	acquisitions	are	complex	growth	strategies	that	involve	multiple	parties.	Sherman’s	(2010)	book	entitled,	Mergers	&	Acquisitions:	From	A	to	Z,	as	well	as	Clayman,	Fridson	and	Troughton’s	(2015)	book	written	for	the	CFA	Institute	on	mergers	and	acquisitions	provide	a	comprehensive	background	on	deals.	According	to	Sherman	(2010),	a	merger	involves	two	or	more	companies	joining	as	peers.	In	a	merger,	the	buying	firm	typically	retains	its	original	identity	and	absorbs	the	assets	and	liabilities	of	the	selling	firm.	There	are	multiple	classifications	of	mergers	that	are	related	to	the	business	activities	of	the	two	parties	merging.	A	horizontal	merger	occurs	when	the	companies	are	in	the	same	line	of	business,	and	are	often	competing	with	one	another.	A	vertical	merger	transpires	when	two	companies	are	in	the	same	line	of	production.	Finally,	a	conglomerate	merger	results	when	two	companies	in	unrelated	lines	of	business	join	together	(Clayman,	Fridson	and	Troughton,	2015).		An	acquisition	can	be	defined	as	one	company	acting	as	the	buyer,	or	the	acquirer,	and	another	company	acting	as	the	seller,	or	the	target	company	(Clayman,	Fridson	and	Troughton,	2015).		There	are	multiple	forms	of	payment	that	companies	can	use	to	pay	for	the	transaction.	They	include	cash,	securities	purchase	and	asset	purchase.	In	a	securities,	or	stock,	purchase	transaction,	the	“seller’s	shares	are	not	necessarily	combined	with	the	buyer’s	existing	company,	but	are	often	kept	separate	as	a	new	subsidiary	or	operating	division”	(Sherman,	2010,	p.	3).	In	an	asset	purchase	transaction,	the	assets	sold	to	the	buyer	become	additional	assets	of	the	company.	The	hope	of	the	acquiring	company	is	that	the	value	of	the	assets	purchased	from	
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the	target	company	will	surpass	the	price	paid,	and	ultimately	enhance	shareholder	value	over	time	(Sherman,	2010).		There	has	been	a	significant	amount	of	prior	research	on	executives’	motivation	for	mergers	and	acquisitions.	In	KPMG’s	survey	of	550	mergers	and	acquisitions	professionals,	it	was	concluded	that	the	“top	factor	by	far	was	an	organizational	desire	to	fortify	their	competitive	position”	(KPMG	LLP,	2016,	p.	6).	To	become	more	competitive	and	create	value	for	stakeholders,	it	is	often	assumed	that	synergies	are	the	optimal	means	to	that	end.	As	discussed	earlier,	synergies	are	defined	as	“the	source	of	the	tangible	expected	improvement	in	earnings	that	occurs	when	two	businesses	merge”	(Walker,	Hansell,	Kengelbach,	Bathia	and	Dawson,	2016).		While	synergies	are	often	a	broad	objective	of	executives,	the	desire	to	participate	in	a	deal	can	also	be	examined	more	specifically	by	considering	the	reasons	for	mergers	and	acquisitions	separately.	Sherman	(2010)	discusses	the	specific	motivations	for	each.	For	a	merger,	the	author	identifies	multiple	objectives	including	the	desire	to	add	a	new	product	line,	enter	a	new	market,	or	increase	distribution	reach	geographically	or	demographically	(Sherman,	2010).	Sherman	adds	the	following	as	potential	motivations	for	mergers:	obtain	tax	benefits,	redistribute	excess	capital	for	more	cost-effective	uses,	increase	the	scale	of	production	for	current	products,	advance	technology,	“restructure	industry	value	chain,	and	respond	to	competitive	cost	pressures	through	economies	of	scale	and	scope”	(Sherman,	2010,	p.	11-12).	Furthermore,	although	firms	often	initiate	a	merger	as	a	growth	strategy,	deals	can	also	be	motivated	by	the	necessity	to	stay	afloat	and	survive	bad	times.	A	merger	or	acquisition	can	help	a	company	avoid	
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bankruptcy	or	shutting	down.	In	his	analysis	of	the	reasons	why	mergers	are	initiated,	Sherman	(2010)	also	adds	that	deals	may	be	driven	by	a	key	trend	in	a	specific	industry.	For	example,	in	the	banking	and	telecommunications	industries,	robust	competition	is	driving	deals,	whereas	shifting	consumer	preferences	are	motivating	deals	in	the	food	and	beverage	industry.	In	the	health-care	industry,	Sherman	(2010)	cites	the	pressure	to	control	costs	as	the	main	factor	driving	deals,	whereas	a	general	reduction	in	demand,	specifically	a	declining	federal	defense	budget,	is	motivating	deals	in	the	defense	contract	and	aerospace	industries	(p.	7).	In	addition	to	mergers,	Sherman	(2010)	evaluates	the	reasons	for	initiating	acquisitions.	As	a	result	of	the	nature	of	acquisitions,	the	motivations	need	to	be	considered	separately	for	the	buying	and	selling	company.	For	the	seller,	Sherman	(2010)	states	that	a	company	desiring	great	access	to	the	resources	of	the	buyer,	an	inability	to	compete	as	an	independent	entity	or	the	desire	or	necessity	to	reduce	costs	can	all	act	as	motivations	to	initiate	an	acquisition.	According	to	Sherman	(2010),	there	are	multiple	factors	that	drive	an	acquisition	for	the	buyer	which	include:	“revenue	enhancement,	cost	reduction,	vertical	and/or	horizontal	operational	synergies	or	economies	of	scale,	growth	pressures	from	investors,	underutilized	resources,	desire	to	reduce	competition,	need	to	gain	market	share	in	new	geographic	region,	diversify	new	products	and	services”	(p.	10-11).	Furthermore,	Christensen	et	al.	(2011)	suggest	that	a	company	may	elect	to	partake	in	an	acquisition	to	reinvent	its	business	model	and	fundamentally	redirect	itself,	as	well	as	to	improve	the	company’s	performance	(p.	2).	The	varying	motivations	for	mergers	and	acquisitions	enable	deals	to	meet	a	variety	of	objectives,	and	ultimately	
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contribute	to	why	mergers	and	acquisitions	are	the	primary	strategy	of	corporate	development	regardless	of	the	risk	the	company	may	be	undertaking.		
C. Drivers	of	Value	Creation	in	Mergers	and	Acquisitions	Mergers	and	acquisitions	remain	at	the	forefront	of	inorganic	growth	strategies	for	executives	seeking	to	improve	performance	and	create	value	for	their	companies.	The	support	for	deals	by	executives	demonstrates	the	monetary,	strategic,	and	social	importance	they	have	in	corporate	finance.	Although	many	believe	deals	are	the	optimal	approach	to	generating	inorganic	growth,	mergers	and	acquisition	performance	remains	disappointing.	In	an	effort	to	understand	why	mergers	and	acquisitions	frequently	underperform,	it	is	critical	to	evaluate	the	factors	that	drive	a	successful	deal.	There	is	a	vast	amount	of	literature	that	attempts	to	understand	the	low	success	rates	of	mergers	and	acquisitions,	and	the	commonalities	amongst	value-returning	deals.		Through	a	survey	of	previous	research,	it	is	evident	there	are	countless	factors	deemed	relevant	to	a	successful	deal,	but	certain	characteristics	are	more	critical	and	most	commonly	connected	with	merger	and	acquisition	performance.	Gomes,	Angwin,	Weber	and	Tarba	(2013)	surveyed	an	abundance	of	merger	and	acquisition	literature	to	understand	which	factors	are	most	critical	to	success	in	the	pre-acquisition	and	post-acquisition	periods.	Gomes	et	al.	(2013)	asserts	it	is	critical	to	make	the	distinction	because	the	process	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	must	be	taken	into	consideration.	The	first	factor	Gomes	et	al.	consider	is	the	actual	selection	of	a	strategic	partner	for	the	merger	or	acquisition.	The	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	each	company	should	be	evaluated	to	ensure	“strategic	and	organizational	fit”	
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(Gomes	et	al.,	2013,	p.19).	In	order	to	assess	the	fit	of	the	company,	Gomes	et	al.	recommends	the	following	dimensions	be	examined:	“strengths	and	weaknesses,	future	investment	requirements,	quality	of	the	target	company’s	management	team,	and	implementation	barriers	including	cultural	differences	and	human	resources	implications	such	as	top	management	turnover”	(Gomes	et	al.,	2013,	p.19).	Furthermore,	the	actual	size	of	the	participating	companies	should	be	weighed	as	this	can	have	implications	on	the	overall	fit.	Another	factor	the	authors	deliberated	in	their	review	of	literature	to	be	of	importance	for	a	deal’s	performance	is	the	transaction	price.	From	a	financial	perspective,	the	authors	concluded	that	if	the	buying	firm	pays	a	price	that	is	considered	too	high,	it	would	greatly	increase	the	failure	rate.	Gomes	et	al.	(2013)	cite	research	by	Goold,	Campbell	and	Alexander	(1994,	p.220),	who	found	“one	of	the	most	common	and	most	important	sources	of	value	destruction	in	corporate	development	is	paying	too	much.	Often	the	acquirer	destroys	value	by	paying	too	much,	making	it	very	difficult	to	achieve	an	adequate	return.”	In	addition	to	the	possibility	of	being	unable	to	attain	a	positive	return	due	to	paying	an	excessive	price,	stakeholders	of	the	buying	company	may	perceive	the	deal	as	a	poor	growth	strategy,	and	thus	will	respond	negatively.		Post-acquisition	critical	success	factors	are	also	of	importance	to	ensure	value	creation.	Gomes	et	al.	(2013)	emphasize	the	integration	period	is	of	primary	significance	for	a	successful	merger	or	acquisition.	The	authors	highlight	multiple	elements	of	integration	including	the	overall	strategy	and	pace.	First,	as	a	function	of	the	multi-dimensional	nature	of	mergers	and	acquisitions,	integration	strategies	
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should	reflect	the	specific	features	of	the	deal.		By	tailoring	the	integration	approach	to	the	deal,	executives	can	exploit	the	strengths	and	areas	of	growth	for	both	firms.	In	addition	to	the	overall	strategy	of	the	integration	period,	the	speed	of	implementation	is	associated	with	the	merger	and	acquisition	performance.	Gomes	at	al.	(2013)	found	that	although	it	can	be	discomforting	for	executives,	it	is	optimal	for	the	integration	of	both	companies	to	be	as	quick	as	possible.	The	authors	state,	“Proceeding	slowly	may	cause	uncertainty	to	build	and	rumor	to	thrive.	Morale	can	suffer,	and	customers	get	forgotten”	(Gomes	et	al.,	2013,	p.24).	They	reinforce	the	importance	of	a	swift	integration	period	by	asserting,	“The	costs	of	losing	the	momentum	of	a	business	are	much	greater	than	the	costs	associated	with	mistakes	through	quick	decisions”	(Gomes	et	al.,	2013,	p.24).	This	demonstrates	the	potential	loss	of	value	to	shareholders	that	could	result	slow	implementation.	In	their	study	of	European	mergers	and	acquisitions	and	their	shareholder	value	creation,	Campa	and	Hernando	(2004)	consider	key	value	drivers	for	deals.	The	authors	suggest	the	presence	of	synergies,	whether	through	cost	reduction,	removal	of	duplicate	activities,	or	development	of	economies	of	scale,	is	of	critical	importance.	Mergers	and	acquisitions	with	higher	levels	of	synergies	have	proven	to	return	higher	value	compared	to	unrelated	mergers	because	there	is	a	higher	“degree	of	relatedness	between	the	buyer	and	seller	[which]	is	positively	associated	with	returns”	(Campa	and	Hernando,	2004,	p.	58).	Another	value	driver	for	deals	discussed	by	the	authors	is	value	investment.	While	not	as	thoroughly	researched	as	other	characteristics	of	successful	mergers	and	acquisitions,	this	theory	proposes	that	value	investment	will	likely	create	value	for	the	participating	firms.	Campa	and	
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Hernando	(2004)	define	value	investment	as,	“when	buyers	purchase	apparently	cheap	firms	(low	book-to-market	ratios)”	(p.61).	The	authors	found	that	acquiring	companies	following	this	approach	obtained	positive	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	while	buyers	purchasing	companies	with	high	book-to-market	value	ratios	experienced	a	negative	stock	market	reaction.		As	demonstrated	by	the	review	of	the	literature	on	factors	driving	performance	of	mergers	and	acquisition,	it	is	evident	that	deals	are	multi-dimensional	and	require	careful	planning	and	integration	to	ensure	value	generation	to	shareholders.	
D. Prior	Research	on	Mergers	and	Acquisitions	Wealth	Effects	The	complex	phenomenon	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	has	attracted	an	abundance	of	executives	and	researchers	from	a	wide	array	of	disciplines.	A	large	emphasis	of	current	research	focuses	on	the	features	that	define	a	successful	deal	versus	one	that	fails	because,	contrary	to	their	popularity,	mergers	and	acquisitions	continue	to	deliver	a	mixed	performance	for	the	expansive	range	of	stakeholders	involved.	While	it	is	imperative	to	consider	the	defining	factors	that	drive	a	successful	deal,	research	also	must	be	performed	to	evaluate	the	value	that	deals	are	creating,	or	not,	for	companies.	The	research	on	this	topic	is	most	relevant	for	this	thesis,	as	its	primary	focus	is	to	determine	if	acquiring	firms	are	realizing	positive	returns	following	an	acquisition.	The	remainder	of	this	literature	review	examines	wealth	creation	or	destruction	following	a	merger	or	acquisition.		Cartwright	and	Schoenberg	(2006)	consider	this	phenomenon	and	discuss	the	mixed	performance	of	deals,	with	a	primary	focus	on	acquisitions.	The	authors	highlight	discrepancies	between	returns	experienced	by	target	and	acquiring	firms.	
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Cartwright	and	Schoenberg	(2006)	cite	research	by	Agrawal	and	Jaffe	(2000)	who	found	that	target	companies	typically	achieve	positive	short-term	returns,	whereas	acquiring	companies	are	more	likely	to	face	negative	returns	in	the	short-term.	In	addition	to	considering	the	short-term	effects	on	stock	prices,	Cartwright	and	Schoenberg	(2006)	assessed	stock	prices	over	a	longer	time	period,	as	this	is	more	indicative	of	the	firm’s	long-term	value.	For	target	firms,	the	research	by	Agrawal	and	Jaffe	(2000)	reveals	that	“the	abnormal	returns	accruing	to	acquiring	firms	in	the	years	following	an	acquisition	are	negative	or,	at	best,	not	statistically	different	from	zero”	(Cartwright	and	Schoenberg,	2006,	p.6).	The	performance	of	acquisitions	for	the	buying	companies	is	also	mediocre,	with	35-45%	of	acquirers	experiencing	positive	returns	in	the	two	to	three	years	post-deal	(Cartwright	and	Schoenberg,	2006).	In	addition	to	evaluating	post-acquisition	wealth	effects	in	the	form	of	stock	prices,	Cartwright	and	Schoenberg	(2006)	also	discuss	whether	the	original	objectives	of	a	deal	were	met	as	a	measure	of	success.	The	authors	found	that	internal	managers	of	acquiring	firms	conclude	that	only	56%	of	acquisitions	can	be	deemed	successful	against	the	initial	objectives	set	out	for	the	deal.	These	results	emphasize	the	mixed	performance	of	deals	and	the	necessity	to	continue	to	evaluate	mergers	and	acquisitions	in	more	depth	to	determine	if	they	are	worth	the	potential	risk.	In	a	study	conducted	by	Chan,	Ge	and	Lin	(2015),	the	authors	collected	data	on	7,047	deals	that	occurred	between	January	1996	and	December	2010	to	analyze	the	effect	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	announcements	on	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	In	their	research,	the	authors	found	that	a	majority	of	target	firms	experience	
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positive	cumulative	abnormal	returns	following	a	deal	announcement.	Furthermore,	the	authors	estimated	the	mean	return	for	target	firms	to	be	16.62%,	which	they	found	to	be	significantly	higher	than	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	acquirers	(Chan,	Ge	and	Lin,	2015,	p.	1077).	From	these	results,	it	appears	shareholders	of	target	firms	view	acquisitions	optimistically	and	expect	positive	returns.		In	the	study,	the	authors	also	found	that	acquisition	announcements	for	the	acquirers	have	varied	perceptions	by	investors.	Circumstances	that	typically	lead	to	beneficial	results	include	whether	the	acquisition	involves	firms	within	the	same	industry	and	whether	the	transaction	is	funded	by	cash	or	debt	(Chan,	Ge	and	Lin,	2015,	p.	1060).	Chan,	Ge	and	Lin’s	research	highlights	the	discrepancies	in	the	returns	of	the	buying	firm	and	acquired	firm,	and	the	role	that	investors’	perceptions	may	play	in	the	variation.		Furthermore,	McKinsey	&	Company	conducted	a	study	on	231	deals	in	the	global	telecommunications,	European	banking,	and	global	petroleum	sectors	to	address	the	assertion	that	“at	least	half	of	all	the	big	mergers,	acquisitions,	and	alliances	that	make	headlines	fail	to	create	significant	shareholder	value”	(Bieshaar,	Knight	and	van	Wassenaer,	2001).	The	study	found	that	deals	with	an	“expansionist”	approach,	with	objectives	like	opening	new	distribution	outlets	or	expanding	the	combined	companies’	reach	result	in	the	greatest	increase	in	stock	value.	In	contrast,	“transformative”	deals,	which	are	intended	to	diversify,	are	more	likely	to	destroy	value	(Bieshaar,	Knight	and	van	Wassenaer,	2001).	This	demonstrates	that	mergers	and	acquisitions	with	the	goal	of	fundamentally	changing	the	company	have	less	favorable	market	reactions	than	deals	that	aim	to	develop	or	grow	current	assets	of	
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both	companies.	Another	finding	of	the	study	was	that	when	all	else	was	held	equal,	the	markets	performed	best	for	acquisitions	compared	to	mergers.	McKinsey’s	research	provided	a	wide	array	of	findings	in	regards	to	the	actual	nature	of	the	deal	and	its	probable	performance.		Moffett	and	Naserbakht	(2013)	evaluated	the	financial	effects	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	in	the	United	States	banking	industry	through	analysis	of	stock	price	behavior	of	firms	involved	in	154	deals	that	occurred	between	2000	and	2010.	The	authors	utilized	event	study	methodology	to	investigate	the	financial	impacts	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	on	the	target	and	acquiring	banks.	The	authors	constructed	an	estimation	window	of	-60	to	+60	days,	and	ensured	no	other	special	events	occurred	during	this	time	period,	enabling	them	to	measure	the	stock	market	reaction	through	actual	returns.		The	authors	cite	Neely	and	de	Cossio	(1987)	and	Trifts	and	Scanlon	(1987)	who	concluded	that	during	the	week	a	merger	proposal	is	announced,	target	banks	often	achieve	a	substantial	rise	in	stock	price,	while	the	bidding	banks	experience	a	smaller	drop	in	the	stock	price	(Moffett	and	Naserbakht,	2013).	Conversely,	in	their	study	Moffett	and	Naserbakht	(2013)	found	average	actual	returns	for	both	target	and	acquiring	banks	increased	in	the	short-term	as	a	result	of	merger	and	acquisition	announcements	contradicting	the	majority	of	previous	research	on	the	effect	of	deals	on	stock	prices.	One	possible	explanation	for	this	dissimilarity	is	that	Moffett	and	Naserbakht	analyzed	the	actual	returns	of	the	stock	price	instead	of	the	abnormal	return	like	most	other	research	on	mergers	and	acquisitions.		
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Trifts	and	Scanlon	(2014)	evaluated	the	effects	of	interstate	bank	mergers	on	the	acquiring	and	target	firms’	shareholders.	Through	their	study	of	17	acquired	and	14	acquiring	banks	participating	in	21	deals,	the	authors	found	that	“shareholders	of	acquired	banks	earn	large,	statistically	significant	abnormal	returns	while	shareholders	of	acquiring	banks	earn	insignificant	abnormal	returns	around	the	announcement	of	the	merger”	(Trifts	and	Scanlon,	2014,	p.	311).	In	addition	to	examining	the	effects	on	the	firms’	shareholders,	Trifts	and	Scanlon	(2014)	also	analyzed	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	bases	on	the	size	of	the	bank.	The	authors	concluded	from	their	study	that	smaller	banks	involved	in	interstate	mergers	experienced	considerably	larger	returns	compared	to	larger	banks.	Trifts	and	Scanlon	(2014)	discuss	multiple	explanations	for	this	discrepancy	including	the	platform	in	which	they	are	traded,	predominately	whether	the	companies	are	traded	on	the	New	York	Stock	Exchange	or	over	the	counter.	The	authors	also	suggest	there	may	be	market	segmentation	for	bank	acquisitions,	which	could	lead	to	larger	banks	competing	at	a	higher	level	than	smaller	banks.	This	could	potentially	lead	to	investors	believing	that	large	banks	involved	in	mergers	and	acquisitions	will	not	be	affected	by	a	deal	as	much	because	“they	are	not	materially	altering	the	geographic	scope	of	their	operations,”	whereas	interstate	bank	mergers	“appear	to	represent	valuable	new	opportunities	for	geographic	market	expansion”	(Trifts	and	Scanlon,	2014,	p.311).	Trifts	and	Scanlon’s	(2014)	research	suggests	that	the	market’s	reaction	will	vary	for	the	target	and	acquiring	company,	as	well	as	based	on	the	size	of	the	company.		
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Campa	and	Hernando	(2004)	examine	the	value	generated	to	shareholders	from	262	mergers	and	acquisitions	announcements	involving	European	Union	companies	between	1998	and	2000.	The	authors	utilized	event	study	methodology	and	constructed	seven	different	windows	to	evaluate	cumulative	abnormal	returns:	three	pre-announcement	windows,	one	short-term	window	around	the	announcement	day,	a	window	including	the	announcement	day	and	thirty	days	prior,	and	two	windows	including	post-announcement	returns.	Similar	to	other	merger	and	acquisition	literature,	Campa	and	Hernando	(2004)	found	target	firms	experienced	a	price	run-up	one	month	prior	to	the	announcement	and	an	announcement	effect	with	cumulative	abnormal	returns	of	5%	and	4%	respectively.		Furthermore,	the	authors	concluded	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	post	announcement	were	not	significant	for	the	targets.	For	the	acquiring	companies,	Campa	and	Hernando	(2004)	found	no	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns	pre-	or	post-announcement,	but	did	see	vague	indication	of	a	price	run-up	effect.	When	the	authors	analyzed	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	of	their	entire	sample,	they	found	60%	of	target	firms	experienced	positive	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	while	approximately	55%	of	acquiring	firms	experienced	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	Of	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	displayed	by	the	acquiring	companies,	none	appeared	to	be	statistically	significant.	Campa	and	Hernando	(2004)	findings	reinforce	the	likely	pattern	of	value	creation	for	shareholders	of	target	companies,	but	more	ambiguous	wealth	effects	for	shareholders	of	acquiring	companies				
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E. Conclusion		Research	on	mergers	and	acquisitions	has	grown	in	prevalence	and	scope,	encompassing	more	elements	of	deals	as	a	function	of	the	rise	in	both	frequency	and	value	of	deals	across	the	globe.	While	the	findings	are	mixed,	a	majority	of	the	research	discussed	above	concludes	that	target	firms	typically	experience	some	amount	of	positive	returns	following	a	deal,	but	such	returns	are	more	elusive	for	acquiring	firms.	The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	further	examine	the	uncertainty	of	returns	for	acquiring	companies	and	determine	if	acquisitions	are	a	worthwhile	strategy	for	corporate	growth.	
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CHAPTER	III	
ANALYTICAL	FRAMEWORK	Chapter	III	discusses	the	analytical	framework	utilized	to	examine	the	wealth	effects	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	on	company	shareholders.	In	Section	I,	the	event	study	methodology	is	explained,	and	the	event	study	windows	are	defined	for	this	thesis.	Section	II	defines	abnormal	returns	as	a	primary	measure	to	establish	whether	an	event	led	to	a	systematic	difference	in	a	company’s	returns.	Section	III	discusses	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	a	second	measure	to	estimate	the	return	as	a	result	of	an	acquisition.	Section	IV	states	the	hypothesis	for	this	study.		
A. Event	Study	As	this	thesis	aims	to	evaluate	the	effect	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	on	a	company’s	wealth,	while	specifically	focusing	on	the	returns	to	shareholders	for	the	acquiring	company,	it	is	necessary	to	use	an	analytical	framework	that	can	measure	the	impact	of	the	deal	on	the	company.	In	order	to	do	so,	an	event	study	was	employed.	Economists	use	event	studies	to	assess	the	effect	of	an	economic	event	on	a	company’s	value	using	financial	market	data	because	they	analyze	return	behavior	for	a	sample	of	companies	experiencing	a	similar	type	of	event	(Kothari	and	Warner,	2007).	Event	studies	are	most	commonly	utilized	to	measure	the	impact	of	earnings	announcements,	stock	splits,	dividend	announcements,	and	merger	and	acquisition	announcements	(Moffett	and	Naserbakht,	2013).	This	methodology	is	widely	used	because	event	studies	operate	on	the	assumption	that	markets	are	efficient,	and	therefore	the	asset	prices	of	a	company	will	reflect	an	economic	event	immediately	(Campbell,	Lo	and	MacKinlay,	1997).	Therefore,	an	event’s	economic	impact	on	a	
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firm	can	be	measured	using	a	company’s	stock	prices	over	a	given	time	period,	called	the	event	window.	For	this	thesis,	two	separate	event	windows	were	utilized.	The	first	event	window	was	defined	to	assess	the	immediate	effect	of	the	merger	announcement	and	included	stock	prices	from	two	days	prior	to	the	deal	to	two	days	post	deal.	The	second	event	window	analyzes	the	short-term	effect	of	the	merger	announcement	and	includes	stock	price	from	30	days	prior	to	30	days	post.	In	addition	to	the	event	window,	the	estimation	window,	which	is	utilized	to	predict	the	expected	return,	was	calculated	for	each	company.	The	estimation	window	for	the	immediate	event	window	(-2	to	+2)	included	stock	prices	from	90	days	prior	to	30	days	before	the	deal	announcement.		For	the	second	event	window	(-30	to	+30),	the	estimation	window	included	stocks	prices	from	120	days	prior	to	60	days	prior.	Figure	1	displays	the	formal	definition	of	the	estimation,	event,	and	post-event	windows.	
Figure	1:	Formal	Definition	of	Event	Study	Windows	
	
Source:	Exhibit	constructed	by	author,	inspired	by	Campbell,	Lo	&	McKinley	(1997)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Immediate	Window																	
Where:		 	 	T! = −90 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	 		T! = −30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	T! = −2 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	T! = +2 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	T! = +2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠		
Short-Term	Window		
Where:		 	 	T! = −120 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	 		T! = −60 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	T! = −30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	T! = +30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠	T! = +2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠		
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B. Abnormal	Returns		Utilizing	the	event	study	methodology,	abnormal	returns	are	used	to	measure	the	impact	of	an	acquisition	on	the	acquiring	company.	According	to	Nasdaq,	abnormal	returns	can	be	defined	as	“the	component	of	the	return	that	is	not	due	to	systematic	influences	(market-wide	influences).	In	other	words,	the	abnormal	return	is	the	difference	between	the	actual	return	that	is	expected	to	result	from	market	movements	(normal	return)”	(“Abnormal	Returns”	2016).	Abnormal	returns	are	used	because,	in	addition	to	the	deal,	there	are	multiple	factors	that	could	influence	a	company’s	stock	price	that	would	not	be	captured	by	actual	returns.	Through	the	examination	of	stock	price	behavior	of	US	banks	that	participated	in	acquisitions,	Moffett	and	Naserbakht	(2013)	found	“the	observed	changes	in	the	stock	price	of	a	bank	during	the	event	window	cannot	be	attributed	exclusively	to	that	announcement	since	stock	prices	are	affected	by	a	multitude	of	factors	other	than	the	announcement	of	the	merger	proposal”	(p.	109).	Furthermore,	Kothari	and	Warner	(2007)	assert	that	as	the	abnormal	return	represents	“the	difference	between	the	return	conditional	on	the	event	and	the	expected	return	unconditional	on	the	event,”	it	is	a	“direct	measure	of	the	(unexpected)	change	in	security	holder	wealth	associated	with	the	event”	(p.9).	The	following	equation	displays	the	calculation	for	abnormal	returns	where	ARit,	Rit	and	E(Rit)	are	abnormal	returns,	actual	returns	and	expected	returns,	respectively:		𝐴𝑅!"  =  𝑅!"  −  𝐸(𝑅!")	To	calculate	expected	returns,	the	constant-mean-return	model	or	market	model	can	be	used.	The	constant-mean-return	model	assumes	that	an	“asset’s	return	over	
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time	is	independent	and	identically	normally	distributed	with	a	constant	(time	invariant)	mean	and	variance”	(Campbell,	Lo	and	MacKinlay,	1997,	p.	151).	In	contrast,	the	market	model	assumes	that	the	return	on	an	asset	is	dependent	“on	the	return	on	the	market	portfolio	and	the	extent	of	the	security’s	responsiveness	as	measured	by	beta.	The	return	also	depends	on	conditions	that	are	unique	to	the	firm”	(“Market	Model”	2016).	This	thesis	will	use	the	market	model	to	determine	expected	returns	because	it	is	the	most	widely	used	approach	to	construct	expected	returns	as	it	is	a	more	realistic	representation	of	a	company’s	stock	price	(Brooks,	2013).		
C. Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	To	evaluate	the	effect	of	the	merger	over	the	entire	event	window,	daily	abnormal	returns	are	aggregated	to	calculate	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	By	accumulating	the	abnormal	performance	from	the	entire	event	window,	the	overall	impact	on	the	firm	is	more	easily	defined,	and	can	be	tested	for	significance.	The	following	equation	shows	the	calculation	for	cumulative	abnormal	returns	(CAR)	starting	at	time	t1	through	time	t2	as	the	summation	of	abnormal	returns.		
𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑡!,𝑡! =  𝐴𝑅!!!!!!! 	From	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	a	test	statistic	can	be	constructed	to	determine	if	the	difference	in	a	company’s	returns	following	an	acquisition	announcement	is	statistically	different	from	the	predicted	return.		
D. Hypothesis	
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When	utilizing	an	event	study	framework,	the	goal	is	to	observe	the	level	of	abnormal	returns	resulting	from	a	firm	event.	For	this	thesis,	the	null	hypothesis	is	that	abnormal	returns	will	be	equal	to	zero,	and	therefore	the	acquisition	had	no	effect	on	the	company’s	stock	price.	Furthermore,	the	alternative	hypothesis	is	that	abnormal	returns	will	not	be	equal	to	zero,	thus	there	was	an	effect	on	the	firm’s	stock	price	as	a	due	to	an	acquisition.					
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CHAPTER	IV	
DATA	Chapter	IV	discusses	the	data	utilized	for	this	thesis.	Section	A	explains	the	criteria	developed	to	select	the	sample,	and	section	B	examines	the	sample	more	specifically	by	evaluating	the	companies	in	the	sample	by	transaction	size	and	industry.		
A. Introduction	to	Data	To	evaluate	the	effect	of	an	acquisition	on	shareholder	wealth,	a	sample	of	acquisitions	will	be	examined.	The	sample	was	selected	from	Thomson	Reuter’s	event	database	using	the	following	criteria:	deals	completed	in	the	past	ten	years,	USD	currency	and	deals	that	are	defined	as	“merger”	or	“acquisition.”	This	produced	a	population	of	31,097	mergers	and	acquisitions	that	occurred	from	2005	to	2015.	To	reduce	the	population	further	and	control	for	multiple	external	factors,	an	additional	series	of	criteria	was	developed.	First,	the	target	and	acquirer	companies	had	to	be	headquartered,	or	predominately	located,	in	the	United	States	only.	This	was	in	an	effort	to	reduce	the	effect	of	any	country-specific	regulations	and	laws	for	mergers	and	acquisitions,	as	well	as	limit	the	impact	of	varying	market	and	economic	conditions	of	multiple	countries.	Furthermore,	the	United	States	was	specifically	selected	because	“the	U.S.	continues	to	be	the	favored	M&A	(mergers	and	acquisitions)	destination	because	of	its	relatively	healthy	economy”	(KPMG	LLP,	2016,	p.9).	Next,	the	data	was	filtered	to	include	deals	that	had	been	fully	completed.	While	it	could	be	valuable	to	examine	deals	that	are	still	in	the	process	of	implementation	and	integration	or	deals	that	ultimately	failed	to	materialize,	for	
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consistency,	in	this	study,	all	acquisition	transactions	had	to	be	completed.	A	final	criterion	for	inclusion	in	the	sample	is	the	value	of	the	transaction	had	to	exceed	$1.5	billion.	This	is	to	ensure	that	all	acquisitions	were	of	substantial	size,	and	a	significant	event	in	a	company’s	news.		A	stratified	random	sample	of	50	deals	from	2005	to	2009	was	selected.	Within	the	sample,	ten	acquisitions	were	selected	from	2005,	2006,	2007,	2008	and	2009	to	provide	an	equal	distribution	of	acquisitions	across	the	five	years.	The	following	information	was	taken	from	the	Thomson	Reuters	SDC	Platinum	Database	for	each	acquisition:	year,	date	announced,	date	effective,	target	name,	acquiring	name,	and	value	of	transaction.		In	addition	to	the	acquisition	information,	stock	prices	for	each	day	within	a	selected	time	period	were	collected	to	evaluate	whether	the	deal	resulted	in	wealth	creation	for	the	shareholders.	For	each	acquisition,	the	acquiring	firm’s	stock	price	was	found	using	Yahoo	Finance.	Stock	prices	for	every	trading	day	one-year	prior	to	one-year	post	of	the	date	announced	were	collected.	If	the	market	was	not	open	on	the	day	the	acquisition	was	announced,	data	from	the	next	trading	day	thereafter	was	used.	The	company’s	dividends,	if	applicable,	were	automatically	accounted	for	in	the	adjusted	closing	price,	which	was	used	to	calculate	the	returns.	To	assess	the	effect	of	a	deal	on	the	company’s	stock	prices	through	an	analysis	of	abnormal	returns,	the	expected	return	of	each	company	must	be	found.	Expected	return	is	expressed	as	a	function	of	the	company’s	stock	potential	return	outcomes	and	associated	probabilities	(Teall,	1958).	To	accomplish	this,	market	data	was	collected	for	the	same	24-month	time	period	for	each	individual	acquisition.			
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B. Discussion	of	Sample		As	previously	mentioned,	the	sample	for	this	thesis	was	randomly	selected	and	included	50	acquisitions	that	had	their	official	deal	announcements	between	2005	and	2009.	The	acquisitions	covered	a	range	of	industries	including	consumer	retail,	energy	service,	financial	services,	health	care/life	sciences,	industrial	goods,	real	estate/gaming/leisure,	and	technology/media/telecommunications.	To	categorize	the	companies	by	industry,	Wall	Street	Journal’s	summary	information	for	each	company	was	utilized.	Table	1	displays	the	distribution	of	acquisitions	across	the	various	industries.		
Table	1:	Distribution	of	Sample	Across	Industries	
	Roughly	30%	of	the	companies	in	the	sample	belong	to	the	technology,	media	and	telecommunications	industry.	The	financial	services	and	consumer	retail	industries	each	had	approximately	20%	of	the	sample,	whereas	companies	in	the	energy	service	and	healthcare/life	sciences	industries	comprised	10%	each.	Industrial	goods	and	real	estate/gaming/leisure	had	the	smallest	representation	in	the	sample.	Of	the	50	companies	in	the	sample,	47	are	S&P500	companies.	Prominent	acquiring	companies	include	Proctor	and	Gamble,	Hewlett	Packard,	Verizon,	AT&T,	Boeing,	Wells	Fargo	&	Co,	Bank	of	America,	Berkshire	Hathaway,	
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Cisco	Systems,	Dow	Chemical	Company,	Walt	Disney,	Johnson	and	Johnson,	Microsoft,	Oracle,	Pfizer,	Comcast,	and	MetLife.		The	ten	largest	acquisitions	had	transaction	values	of	greater	than	$18	billion.	The	acquiring	companies	in	these	deals	included	Pfizer	Inc.,	Proctor	&	Gamble,	Exxon	Mobile	Corporation,	Bank	of	America,	Verizon	Wireless,	Boston	Scientific	Corporation,	CVS	Pharmacy,	Comcast	Corporation,	and	Chevron	Texaco	Corporation.	
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CHAPTER	V	
RESULTS	Chapter	V	presents	the	findings	of	the	event	study.	First,	cumulative	abnormal	returns	and	test-statistics	are	presented	for	each	event	window.	Next,	the	acquisitions	were	characterized	by	transaction	value	and	industry	to	determine	if	these	variables	impacted	the	wealth	effects	of	the	acquisition.	Finally,	regression	analyses	were	completed	to	examine	the	relationship	between	the	acquisition	announcement	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	as	well	as	acquirer	characteristics.	
A. Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	As	discussed	earlier,	cumulative	abnormal	returns	is	a	metric	utilized	in	an	event	study	to	evaluate	the	effect	of	a	deal	on	a	company’s	stock	during	the	event	window.	It	demonstrates	the	differences	between	the	expected	return	and	the	actual	return	of	the	company’s	stock	resulting	from	the	acquisition	announcement.	Test	statistics	for	each	acquisition’s	cumulative	abnormal	returns	were	calculated	to	determine	whether	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	experienced	by	the	company	were	significantly	different	from	zero.	Table	2	displays	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	and	test-statistics	for	the	event	window	measuring	the	immediate	effect	(-2	days	to	+2	days)	of	the	deal	announcement.		
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Table	2:	CAR	for	Immediate	Event	Window		
	**Significant	at	the	.05	level,	*Significant	at	the	.10	level	
Company CAR T-Statistic
Procter	&	Gamble	Co -6.592% -3.500**
SBC	Communications	Inc -1.430% -0.3181
Boston	Scientific	Corp -1.253% -0.247
Duke	Energy	Corp -5.694% -1.994**
Federated	Department	Stores	(M) 5.394% 0.694
ChevronTexaco	Corp -2.414% -0.361
Bank	of	America	Corp -4.113% -1.632
MetLife	Inc -3.469% -1.598
Verizon	Communications	Inc -0.546% -0.895
Cisco	Systems	Inc -2.393% -0.908
Boeing	Co 0.345% 0.135
Capital	One	Financial	Corp -5.356% -0.551
Thermo	Electron	Corp -2.036% -0.665
Motorola	Inc 3.984% 2.191**
Home	Depot	Inc 4.842% 1.61
Bank	of	America	Corp -0.858% -0.908
Johnson	&	Johnson -4.059% -2.326**
Rite	Aid	Corp -4.168% -0.321
Walt	Disney	Co -3.932% -1.184
CVS	Corp -8.299% -1.151
Coca-Cola	Co 2.549% 2.183**
Transocean	Inc 8.599% 1.802*
National	Oilwell	Varco	Inc -5.795% -0.699
Oracle	Corp -2.657% -0.987
Microsoft	Corp -1.970% -1.212
Bank	of	America	Corp -2.563% -1.467
Cisco	Systems	Inc 0.643% 0.365
UnitedHealth	Group	Inc -0.638% -0.229
IHOP	Corp 12.853% 1.512
Berkshire	Hathaway	Inc 3.535% 1.078
Hewlett	Packard	Co -6.559% -0.731
The	JM	Smucker	Co -0.264% -0.085
The	Dow	Chemical	Co -6.895% -1.436
CVS	Health	Corp 0.011% 0.005
CME	Group	Inc -5.052% -0.923
International	Paper	Co -14.759% -1.455
Boston	Properties	Inc -0.470% -0.199
Wells	Fargo	&	Co 20.842% 2.361**
Brocade	Commun	Sys	Inc -25.954% -1.116
Verizon	Wireless	Inc 2.179% 0.486
Oracle	Corp 3.971% 1.113
DirecTV	Group	Inc	(ATT) 0.581% 0.377
MetLife	Inc -11.400% -8.581**
Exxon	Mobil	Corp -7.042% -1.564
Comcast	Corp 16.778% 1.931*
Simon	Property	Group	Inc 0.972% 0.216
Walt	Disney	Co -2.704% -0.976
Xerox	Corp -17.273% -0.995
Pfizer	Inc -16.278% -1.473
Express	Scripts	Inc 18.211% 1.044
Average	CAR	for	Sample -1.572%
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Table	2	shows	33	of	the	50,	or	66%,	of	acquisitions	led	to	some	level	of	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	the	buying	company.	Negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	demonstrate	a	negative	stock	market	reaction,	and	could	indicate	investor	concerns	about	the	“expected	value	resulting	from	future	synergies	or	wealth	redistribution	among	stakeholders”	(Campa	and	Hernando,	2004,	47).	Of	the	33	acquisitions	that	realized	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	four	companies	had	cumulative	abnormal	returns	significant	at	the	.05	level	during	the	event	window.	These	companies	include	Proctor	&	Gamble	Co,	Duke	Energy	Corp,	MetLife	Inc.,	and	Johnson	&	Johnson.	MetLife	Inc.’s	shareholders	experienced	the	most	substantial	negatives	returns	when	compared	to	the	expected	return.	The	test-statistic	for	this	acquisition	was	equal	to		-8.581,	which	demonstrates	the	high	level	of	confidence	that	the	null	hypothesis,	which	states	cumulative	abnormal	returns	are	not	equal	to	zero,	is	false.		Furthermore,	Table	2	reports	that	17,	or	33%,	of	acquiring	companies	realized	positive	cumulative	abnormal	returns	following	the	purchase	of	another	company.	This	suggests	a	positive	market	reaction,	and	shareholders’	positive	expectations	for	the	acquisition.	Of	the	17	acquisitions,	three	had	cumulative	abnormal	returns	significant	at	the	.05	level.	The	acquiring	companies	in	these	acquisitions	are	Coca-Cola	Co.,	Motorola	Inc.,	and	Wells	Fargo	&	Co.	An	additional	two	acquisitions	experienced	cumulative	abnormal	returns	that	were	significant	at	the	.10	level	for	shareholders.	The	buying	companies	in	these	deals	involved	Transocean	Inc.	and	Comcast	Corporation.		
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A	similar	analysis	of	cumulative	abnormal	returns	was	conducted	to	assess	the	short-term	(-30	days	to	+30	days)	wealth	effects	a	result	of	the	deal	announcement.	Table	3	reports	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	and	test	statistics	for	each	acquiring	company	during	this	event	window.		
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Table	3:	CAR	for	Short-Term	Event	Window	
	
	 																	
**Significant	at	the	.05	level,	significant	at	the	.10	level	As	seen	in	Table	3,	31	acquisitions	resulted	in	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	during	the	short-term	event	window.	Of	the	31	acquisitions,	five	companies	
Company CAR T-Statistic 
Procter & Gamble Co 2.259% 0.326 
SBC Communications Inc -5.810% -0.999 
Boston Scientific Corp 8.782% 0.719 
Duke Energy Corp -2.081% -0.34 
Federated Dept. Stores 1.108% 0.092 
ChevronTexaco Corp -2.118% -0.193 
Bank of America Corp -11.528% -2.441** 
MetLife Inc -1.690% -0.231 
Verizon Communications Inc -9.565% -1.379 
Cisco Systems Inc 4.296% 0.506 
Boeing Co 1.835% 0.215 
Capital One Financial Corp -0.981% -0.084 
Thermo Electron Corp -12.542% -1.65* 
Motorola Inc -1.923% -0.179 
Home Depot Inc 3.465% 0.419 
Bank of America Corp -10.434% -2.184** 
Johnson & Johnson 14.104% 2.532** 
Rite Aid Corp -17.201% -0.918 
Walt Disney Co 14.240% 1.339 
CVS Corp -34.122% -1.981** 
Coca-Cola Co 3.225% 0.685 
Transocean Inc 3.708% 0.289 
National Oilwell Varco Inc -35.346% -1.407 
Oracle Corp 3.375% 0.26 
Microsoft Corp 3.812% 0.646 
Bank of America Corp -0.357% -0.072 
Cisco Systems Inc -11.020% -1.46 
UnitedHealth Group Inc 9.636% 0.909 
IHOP Corp 10.069% 0.718 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc 0.680% 0.054 
Hewlett Packard Co 6.009% 0.531 
The JM Smucker Co -8.721% -0.67 
The Dow Chemical Co -17.139% -1.739 
CVS Health Corp -16.659% -1.548 
CME Group Inc -25.498% -1.052 
International Paper Co -11.688% -0.744 
Boston Properties Inc -5.641% -0.509 
Wells Fargo & Co 67.610% 1.884* 
Brocade Commun Sys Inc -12.588% -0.424 
Verizon Wireless Inc 20.169% 2.186** 
Oracle Corp -2.752% -0.165 
DirecTV Group Inc -19.188% -1.851* 
MetLife Inc -24.917% -1.674* 
Exxon Mobil Corp -0.577% -0.087 
Comcast Corp -2.788% -0.199 
Simon Property Group Inc -4.654% -0.356 
Walt Disney Co -9.929% -0.975 
Xerox Corp -34.209% -1.547 
Pfizer Inc -23.881% -1.467 
Express Scripts Inc 3.932% 0.154 
Average CAR for Sample  -3.905%   	
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realized	cumulative	abnormal	returns	that	were	statistically	significant	from	zero.	These	companies	included	Bank	of	America	(both	acquisitions	in	the	sample),	Thermo	Electron	Corp,	CVS	Corporation,	Direct	TV	Group,	and	MetLife	Inc.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	only	acquisition	that	had	significant	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	in	both	event	windows	is	MetLife	Inc.		When	compared	with	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	experienced	by	the	companies	during	the	immediate	event	window,	there	are	two	fewer	companies	in	the	sample	that	had	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	Although	there	were	fewer	acquisitions	that	resulted	in	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	in	the	short-term	event	window,	there	was	an	additional	company	that	experienced	statistically	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	Furthermore,	through	the	comparison	of	the	average	of	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	the	entire	sample	for	the	different	event	windows,	it	is	evident	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	realized	in	the	short-term	event	window	were	of	a	larger	magnitude	than	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	in	the	immediate	event	window.	The	immediate	event	window’s	average	cumulative	abnormal	is	equal	to	-1.572%,	whereas	the	average	for	the	short-term	event	window	is	-3.905%.	This	highlights	substantial	intensification	in	magnitude	of	the	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	realized	by	the	companies	in	the	short-term	event	window.	Possible	explanations	for	this	could	be	poor	integration	strategies	or	investors’	belief	that	the	buying	company	will	not	be	better	off	as	a	result	of	the	acquisition.		Moreover,	Table	3	reports	that	19	of	the	acquiring	companies	realized	positive	cumulative	abnormal	returns	in	the	60	days	surrounding	the	deal	
	 37	
announcement.	Of	these	companies,	three	had	statistically	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	These	companies	include	Johnson	&	Johnson,	Wells	Fargo	&	Co,	and	Verizon	Wireless	Inc.	Wells	Fargo	is	the	only	company	to	experience	cumulative	abnormal	returns	statistically	significant	from	zero	during	both	event	windows.	Furthermore,	Johnson	&	Johnson	realized	significant	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	during	the	immediate	event	window,	but	significant	positive	cumulative	abnormal	returns	in	the	short-term	event	window,	indicating	the	market’s	response	can	vary	greatly	between	event	windows.	In	addition	to	assessing	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	of	each	individual	acquisition,	it	can	be	beneficial	to	determine	whether	the	entire	sample	of	acquisitions	experienced	cumulative	abnormal	returns	at	a	statistically	significant	level.	If	the	entire	sample	was	significant,	it	would	demonstrate	that	when	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	of	all	50	study	acquisitions	were	averaged,	they	were	statistically	different	from	zero.	To	evaluate	whether	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	were	significant	for	the	entire	sample	of	acquisitions,	a	t-test	on	average	cumulative	abnormal	returns	was	run.		The	following	estimation	model	was	used	to	run	the	regression:		𝐶𝐴𝑅! = ∝!+∈! 	Table	4	displays	the	regression	analysis	for	the	entire	sample	of	acquisitions.		
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Table	4:	Regression	Analysis	for	Immediate	Event	Window		
	As	shown	in	Table	4,	the	negative	coefficient	implies	that	when	averaged	together,	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	realized	by	the	50	acquiring	companies	were	negative	however	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	entire	sample	were	not	statistically	different	from	zero	during	the	immediate	event	window.	The	extremely	low	r-squared	suggests	there	is	a	large	amount	of	unexplained	variation	within	the	sample.	In	the	context	of	this	research,	it	indicates	there	is	a	vast	amount	of	variance	amongst	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	that	the	acquiring	companies	experience.		Table	5	displays	the	regression	analysis	of	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	the	entire	sample	during	the	short-term	event	window						
		 		 		
Variable		 Coefficient	 	
		 	 		
Constant	 -0.0157	 	
		
																					(0.012)	
	 		
Observations	 50	 		
R-squared	 0.000	 		
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	 		
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 		 			
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Table	5:	Regression	Analysis	for	Short-Term	Event	Window	
		 Table	5	shows	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	the	entire	sample	were	not	statistically	significant	during	the	short-term	event	window.	Similar	to	the	immediate	event	window,	the	companies	in	the	sample	on	average	experienced	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	which	is	indicated	by	the	negative	coefficient.	Furthermore,	the	comparison	of	the	negative	coefficients	of	the	regression	analyses	of	both	event	windows	underpins	the	assertion	that	the	companies	realized	more	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	in	the	short-term	event	window	than	the	immediate	event	window.		 Although	it	would	be	beneficial	to	continue	the	evaluation	of	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	both	event	windows,	the	rest	of	this	analysis	will	only	focus	on	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	realized	in	the	immediate	event	window.	It	is	recommended	for	future	research	to	evaluate	the	wealth	effects	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	on	companies	during	multiple	event	windows.			
		 		 		
Variable		 Coefficient	 	
		 	 		
Constant	 -0.0390	 	
		
																					(0.0229)	
	 		
Observations	 50	 		
R-squared	 0.000	 		
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	 		
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 		 			
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B. Evaluation	of	Impact	of	Transaction	Value	on	CAR		In	addition	to	evaluating	whether	cumulative	abnormal	returns	were	significant	for	each	acquiring	company,	this	study	examined	the	roles	of	specific	variables	that	have	historically	been	known	to	cause	variances	in	returns.	The	first	characteristic	of	the	acquisitions	tested	was	transaction	value.	Transaction	value	indicates	the	size	and	magnitude	of	the	acquisition,	and	can	presumably	affect	the	market’s	response	to	a	merger	or	acquisition	announcement.	Although	the	sample	was	limited	to	acquisitions	with	transaction	values	over	$1.5	billion,	there	is	still	a	large	variance	in	acquisition	size	within	the	sample.	This	is	evidenced	by	the	smallest	transaction	size	being	equal	to	$1.931	billion,	and	the	largest	equaling	$67.286	billion.	Tables	6	and	7	display	the	sample	of	acquisitions	in	ascending	order	of	transaction	value.	Panel	A	includes	the	lowest	ten	transaction	values	from	the	sample.	Panel	B	includes	the	second	quintile;	Panel	C	includes	the	third	quintile,	and	Panels	D	and	E	are	comprised	of	the	20	highest	transaction	values.	As	demonstrated	in	Panel	A	of	Table	6,	none	of	the	acquisitions	with	the	ten	lowest	transaction	values	resulted	in	statistically	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	Furthermore,	of	the	next	ten	acquisitions	in	Panel	B,	two	acquisitions	have	cumulative	abnormal	returns	significant	at	the	.05	significance	level.	These	acquisitions	have	transaction	values	of	$3.88	billion	and	$4.1	billion.	In	Panel	C,	which	covers	acquisitions	with	transaction	values	between	$7	billion	and	$11.7	billion,	one	acquisition	had	cumulative	abnormal	returns	that	were	significant	at	the	.05	significance	level.	In	Panel	D,	four	acquisitions	had	statistically	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	Three	acquisitions,	which	had	transaction	values	of	$15.11	billion,	$15.54	billion,	and	
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$16.6	billion,	were	significant	at	the	.05	level.	One	acquisition,	with	a	transaction	value	of	$17.30	billion,	was	significant	at	the	.10	level.	Finally,	in	Panel	E,	which	contains	the	largest	acquisitions,	two	acquisitions	had	cumulative	abnormal	returns	that	were	significant.	An	acquisition	with	a	transaction	value	of	$23.5	billion	experienced	positive	cumulative	abnormal	returns	that	were	significant	at	the	.10	significance	level,	and	an	acquisition	with	a	transaction	value	of	$59.01	billion	realized	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	at	the	.05	significance	level.					
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Table	6:	Differences	in	CAR	by	Transaction	Value	
**Significant	at	the	.05	level,	*Significant	at	the	.10	level	
		 Company	
Transaction	
Value	 CAR	 T-Statistic	
PANEL	A	 		 		 		 		
		 IHOP	Corp	 1,931.602	 12.853%	 1.511	
		 Boeing	Co	 2,057.10	 0.345%	 0.135	
		 Simon	Property	Group	Inc	 2,325.00	 0.972%	 0.216	
		 Brocade	Commun	Sys	Inc	 2,410.448	 -25.954%	 -1.116	
		 UnitedHealth	Group	Inc	 2,425.343	 -0.638%	 -0.229	
		 CVS	Health	Corp	 2,637.421	 0.011%	 0.005	
		 Cisco	Systems	Inc	 3,090.519	 0.643%	 0.365	
		 Bank	of	America	Corp	 3,300.00	 -0.858%	 -0.908	
		 The	JM	Smucker	Co	 3,300.00	 -0.264%	 -0.085	
		 Rite	Aid	Corp	 3,470.00	 -4.168%	 -0.321	
PANEL	B	 		 		 		 		
		 Home	Depot	Inc	 3,475.355	 4.842%	 1.61	
		 Motorola	Inc	 3,880.468	 3.984%	 2.191**	
		 Boston	Properties	Inc	 3,949.00	 -0.470%	 -0.199	
		 Walt	Disney	Co	 3,958.354	 -2.704%	 -0.976	
		 Coca-Cola	Co	 4,100.00	 2.549%	 2.183**	
		 Berkshire	Hathaway	Inc	 4,500.00	 3.535%	 1.078	
		 Express	Scripts	Inc	 4,675.00	 18.211%	 1.044	
		 International	Paper	Co	 6,000.00	 -14.759%	 -1.455	
		 Microsoft	Corp	 6,333.117	 -1.970%	 -1.212	
		 Cisco	Systems	Inc	 6,865.722	 -2.393%	 -0.908	
PANEL	C	 		 		 		 		
		 Oracle	Corp	 7,305.203	 3.971%	 1.113	
		 National	Oilwell	Varco	Inc	 7,513.454	 -5.795%	 -0.699	
		 Walt	Disney	Co	 7,531.739	 -3.932%	 -1.184	
		 CME	Group	Inc	 7,555.372	 -5.052%	 -0.923	
		 Oracle	Corp	 8,056.049	 -2.657%	 -0.987	
		 Xerox	Corp	 8,374.197	 -17.273%	 -0.995	
		 Verizon	Communications	 8,495.595	 -0.546%	 -0.895	
		 Duke	Energy	Corp	 8,832.943	 -5.694%	 -1.994**	
		 Thermo	Electron	Corp	 10,291.785	 -2.036%	 -0.665	
		 MetLife	Inc	 11,694.656	 -3.469%	 -1.598		
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Table	7:		Differences	in	CAR	by	Transaction	Value	(contd.)
**Significant	at	the	.05	level,	*Significant	at	the	.10	level		 From	the	analysis	of	Tables	6	and	7,	it	is	apparent	that	six	of	the	nine	statistically	significant	(at	the	.05	or	.10	levels)	acquisitions,	or	66%,	have	transaction	values	that	are	amongst	the	highest	twenty	(Panels	D	and	E)	with	four	of	the	six	having	negative	CAR	values.	This	would	suggest	that	acquisitions	with	higher	transaction	values	are	more	likely	to	result	in	lower	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	To	determine	if	the	size	of	the	transaction	is	correlated	with	the	acquiring	firm’s	cumulative	abnormal	returns	during	the	event	period,	a	linear	regression	was	
		 Company	
Transaction	
Value	 CAR	 T-Statistic	
PANEL	D	 		 		 		 		
		 Hewlett	Packard	Co	 12,565.034	 -6.559%	 -0.731	
		 SBC	Communications	Inc	 14,732.64	 -1.430%	 -0.318	
		 Wells	Fargo	&	Co	 15,112.754	 20.842%	 2.361**	
		 Capital	One	Financial	Corp	 15,132.87	 -5.356%	 -0.551	
		 DirecTV	Group	Inc	(ATT)	 15,243.05	 0.581%	 0.377	
		 The	Dow	Chemical	Co	 15,513.132	 -6.895%	 -1.436	
		 MetLife	Inc	 15,543.544	 -11.400%	 -8.581**	
		 Federated	Department	Stores		 16,465.871	 5.394%	 0.694	
		 Johnson	&	Johnson	 16,600.00	 -4.059%	 -2.326**	
		 Transocean	Inc	 17,298.661	 8.599%	 1.802*	
PANEL	E	 		 		 		 		
		 ChevronTexaco	Corp	 18,718.509	 -2.414%	 -0.361	
		 Bank	of	America	Corp	 21,000.00	 -2.563%	 -1.467	
		 Comcast	Corp	 23,500.00	 16.778%	 1.931*	
		 CVS	Corp	 26,293.576	 -8.299%	 -1.151	
		 Boston	Scientific	Corp	 27,861.289	 -1.253%	 -0.247	
		 Verizon	Wireless	Inc	 28,100.00	 2.179%	 0.486	
		 Bank	of	America	Corp	 35,810.268	 -4.113%	 -1.632	
		 Exxon	Mobil	Corp	 40,298.142	 -7.042%	 -1.564	
		 Procter	&	Gamble	Co	 54,906.807	 -6.592%	 -3.500**	
		 Pfizer	Inc	 67,285.695	 -16.278%	 -1.473		
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run	with	transaction	value	as	the	dependent	value,	and	cumulative	abnormal	returns	as	the	dependent	variable	for	the	sample	of	50	acquisitions.		The	following	estimation	model	was	used:	𝐶𝐴𝑅! = ∝ + 𝛽! 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + ∈! 		Table	8	displays	the	regression	output.		
Table	8:	Regression	Analysis	of	Transaction	Value		
	Table	8	shows	the	coefficient	on	transaction	value	of	the	acquisitions	has	a	statistically	significant	negative	correlation	with	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	This	indicates	that	as	transaction	value	increases,	cumulative	abnormal	returns	are	likely	to	become	more	negative.	This	relationship	is	displayed	in	Figure	2.	
	
	
	
	
	 		 		
Variables	 Coefficient	 	
		 	 		
Transaction	Value	 -0.0013*	 	
		
(0.001)	
	 		
Constant	 0.0011	 	
		
(0.016)	
	 		
Observations	 50	 		
R-squared	 0.043	 		
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	 		
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 		 			
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Figure	2:	Transaction	Value	vs.	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	
		 Figure	2	demonstrates	that,	while	there	are	outliers	present	and	some	unexplained	variation	indicated	by	a	low	r-squared,	a	downward	trend	is	evident.	This	is	a	noteworthy	observation,	as	it	appears	that	the	largest	acquisitions,	defined	by	transaction	size,	resulted	in	value	destruction	for	shareholders.	
C. Evaluation	of	Impact	of	Company	Industry	on	CAR	In	addition	to	evaluating	the	role	that	transaction	value	plays	in	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	realized	by	acquiring	firms,	the	company	industry	can	also	be	considered.	For	this	thesis,	the	companies	fell	into	seven	major	industries.	Table	9	displays	the	company	name,	the	respective	industry,	cumulative	abnormal	return,	and	the	test	statistic	for	each	acquisition	that	falls	under	the	consumer	retail,	
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energy	service,	health	care/life	sciences,	industrial	goods,	and	real	estate/gaming/leisure	industries.	
Table	9:	Differences	in	CAR	by	Industry		
	**Significant	at	the	.05	level,	*Significant	at	the	.10	level	Table	10	reports	the	company	name,	industry,	cumulative	abnormal	return,	and	the	test	statistic	for	each	acquisition	that	falls	under	the	financial	services	and	technology/media/telecommunications	industries.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Company Industry CAR T-Statistic
CVS Health Corp Consumer Retail 0.011% 0.005
The JM Smucker Group Consumer Retail -0.264% -0.085
Rite Aid Corp Consumer Retail -4.168% -0.321
Home Depot Inc Consumer Retail 4.842% 1.61
Coca-Cola Inc Consumer Retail 2.549% 2.183**
International Paper Co Consumer Retail -14.759% -1.455
Federated Dept. Stores Consumer Retail 5.394% 0.694
CVS Corp Consumer Retail -8.299% -1.151
Proctor & Gamble Co Consumer Retail -6.592% -3.5**
National Oilwell Varco Inc Energy Service -5.795% -0.699
Duke Energy Corp Energy Service -5.694% -1.994**
Transocean Inc Energy Service 8.599% 1.802*
Chevron Texaco Corp Energy Service -2.414% -0.361
Exxon Mobil Corp Energy Service -7.042% -1.564
UnitedHealth Group Inc Health Care/Life Sciences -0.638% -0.229
Express Scripts Inc Health Care/Life Sciences 18.211% 1.044
Thermo Electron Corp Health Care/Life Sciences -2.036% -0.665
Johnson & Johnson Health Care/Life Sciences -4.059% -2.326**
Boston Scientific Corp Health Care/Life Sciences -1.253% -0.247
Pfizer Inc Health Care/Life Sciences -16.278% -1.473
Boeing Co Industrial Goods 0.345% 0.135
The Dow Chemical Co Industrial Goods -6.895% -1.436
IHOP Corp Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure 12.853% 1.512
Simon Property Group Inc Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure 0.972% 0.216
Boston Properties Inc Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure -0.470% -0.199
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Table	10:	Differences	in	CAR	by	Industry	
	**Significant	at	the	.05	level,	*Significant	at	the	.10	level		 As	seen	in	Tables	9	and	10,	acquisitions	with	cumulative	abnormal	returns	statistically	different	from	zero	are	distributed	across	five	of	the	seven	industries.	These	include:	consumer	retail,	energy	service,	health	care/life	sciences,	financial	services,	and	technology/media/telecommunications.	Thus,	none	of	the	acquisitions	in	the	industrial	goods	and	real	estate/gaming/leisure	industries	had	statistically	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	The	consumer	retail	and	financial	services	industries	had	the	highest	number	of	statistically	significant	acquisitions	with	two,	which	were	all	significant	at	the	.05	level.	The	acquiring	firms	in	the	consumer	retail	industry	are	Coca-Cola	Co	and	Proctor	&	Gamble	Co.	For	the	financial	services	industry,	Wells	Fargo	&	Co	and	MetLife	Inc.	were	the	buying	companies	with	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	Each	had	nine	acquisitions	in	the	
Company Industry CAR T-Statistic 
Bank of America Corp Financial Services -0.858% -0.908 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc Financial Services 3.535% 1.078 
CME Group Inc Financial Services -5.052% -0.923 
MetLife Inc Financial Services -3.469% -1.598 
Wells Fargo & Co Financial Services 20.842% 2.361** 
Capital One Financial Corp Financial Services -5.356% -0.551 
MetLife Inc Financial Services -11.400% -8.58** 
Bank of America Corp Financial Services -2.563% -1.467 
Bank of America Corp Financial Services -4.113% -1.632 
Brocade Commun Sys Inc Technology/Media/Telecom -25.954% -1.116 
Cisco Systems Inc Technology/Media/Telecom 0.643% 0.365 
Motorola Inc Technology/Media/Telecom 3.984% 2.191** 
Walt Disney Co Technology/Media/Telecom -2.704% -0.976 
Microsoft Corp Technology/Media/Telecom -1.970% -1.212 
Cisco Systems Inc Technology/Media/Telecom -2.393% -0.908 
Oracle Corp Technology/Media/Telecom 3.971% 1.113 
Walt Disney Co Technology/Media/Telecom -3.932% -1.184 
Oracle Corp Technology/Media/Telecom -2.657% -0.987 
Xerox Corp Technology/Media/Telecom -17.273% -0.995 
Verizon Communications  Technology/Media/Telecom -0.546% -0.895 
Hewlett Packard Co Technology/Media/Telecom -6.559% -0.731 
SBC Communications Inc Technology/Media/Telecom -1.430% -0.318 
DirecTV Group Inc Technology/Media/Telecom 0.581% 0.377 
Comcast Corp Technology/Media/Telecom 16.778% 1.931* 
Verizon Wireless Inc Technology/Media/Telecom 2.179% 0.486 	
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respective	industries,	which	equates	to	22%	of	the	acquisitions	in	consumer	retail	and	financial	services	having	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	Furthermore,	these	industries	account	for	44%	of	all	statistically	significant	acquisitions.	Health	care/life	sciences	has	one	acquisition	with	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns	at	the	.05	level,	which	was	Johnson	&	Johnson.	In	addition,	energy	service	also	had	one	acquisition	with	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	which	was	for	Duke	Energy	Corporation.	These	industries	each	account	for	11.1%	of	the	overall	sample	of	statistically	significant	acquisitions.		
Further	analysis	was	completed	to	determine	whether	a	company’s	industry	is	a	significant	variable	in	determining	the	cumulative	abnormal	return	an	acquiring	company	will	realize	following	an	acquisition.	A	regression	was	run	with	industry	as	the	independent	variables	and	cumulative	abnormal	returns	as	the	dependent	variable.	Industry	dummy	variables	were	used	for	the	regression	to	allow	for	the	analysis	of	each	industry.		
The	following	estimation	model	was	used	for	the	regression:	
𝐶𝐴𝑅! = ∝!+  𝛽! 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 +  𝛽!𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽!𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑠+ 𝐵!𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 & 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠+  𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 & 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 & 𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒+  𝛽!𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 & 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎 & 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + ∈!	
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Table	11	displays	the	regression	output	for	company	industry	and	cumulative	abnormal	returns.		
Table	11:	Regression	Analysis	of	Company	Industry	
	
	 Table	11	demonstrates	there	is	no	significant	correlation	between	a	company’s	industry	and	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	This	is	further	supported	by	the	coefficients	of	each	industry,	as	they	are	very	low	in	magnitude.		
	
INDUSTRY Coefficient
Robust	Std.	
Error
	Energy	Service -0.001 0.0358
	Financial	Services 0.0143 0.0382
	Health	Care/Life	Sciences 0.0136 0.4992
Industrial	Goods -0.0091 0.0357
Real	Estate/Gaming/Leisure 0.0682 0.0435
Technology/Media/Telecommunications 0.0004 0.0331
Constant -0.0237 0.0226
Observations 50
R-squared 0.041
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Consumer	Retail	Industry	omitted	
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D. Conclusion	Through	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	data	and	results,	it	is	evident	that	on	average,	the	sample	of	acquisitions	resulted	in	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	the	acquiring	firm’s	shareholders.	While	the	entire	sample	did	not	experience	significant	cumulative	abnormal	results	resulting	from	an	event	announcement,	there	were	nine	acquisitions	that	realized	statistically	significant	cumulative	abnormal	returns	during	both	the	immediate	and	short-term	event	windows.	Furthermore,	it	was	found	that	there	is	a	significant	negative	correlation	between	the	transaction	value	of	acquisitions	and	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	The	conclusions	drawn	about	the	relationship	between	event	announcements	and	cumulative	abnormal	returns	to	the	shareholders	of	the	acquiring	firms	are	consistent	with	previous	literature	on	mergers	and	acquisitions	that	find	acquiring	firms	experience	insignificant,	but	often	negative	returns	resulting	from	a	deal.	Furthermore,	they	demonstrate	the	necessity	of	further	research	on	factors	that	influence	the	wealth	effects	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	to	buying	firms.		
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CHAPTER	VI	
CONCLUSION	
A. Summary	of	Findings	Mergers	and	acquisitions	remain	the	primary	means	of	corporate	growth	for	companies	seeking	to	generate	inorganic	growth.	While	their	popularity	is	on	the	rise,	the	performance	of	deals	is	mixed.	Prior	research	on	mergers	and	acquisitions	has	relied	on	the	response	of	the	stock	market	to	indicate	the	wealth	effects	that	arise	from	a	deal.		The	stock	market	reaction	following	a	merger	or	acquisition	announcement	represents	the	changes	in	expected	returns,	or	future	cash	flows,	that	will	be	realized	by	the	shareholders	of	the	involved	firms.	Thus,	the	market	reaction	serves	as	a	proxy	for	the	expected	value	investors	believe	will	result	from	a	deal.	In	this	thesis,	I	evaluated	the	value	generated	to	shareholders	by	US	acquisitions	and	mergers	announced	between	2005	and	2009.		Utilizing	event	study	methodology,	two	event	windows	centered	around	the	announcement	date	were	constructed	and	cumulative	abnormal	returns	were	analyzed.		
Through	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	data,	the	following	conclusions	were	reached.	First,	it	was	found	that	a	majority	(over	60%)	of	acquisitions	led	to	negative	cumulative	abnormal	returns	for	the	shareholders	in	both	event	windows.	Of	this	majority,	only	less	than	five	acquisitions	led	to	CARs	that	were	statistically	different	from	zero.	Therefore,	it	can	be	concluded	that	merger	and	acquisition	announcements	led	to	insignificant	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	which	were	more	than	likely	negative	for	the	shareholders	of	the	acquiring	firms.	When	comparing	the	cumulative	abnormal	returns	of	the	immediate	event	window	(-2	days	to	+2	days)	
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and	the	short-term	event	window	(-30	days	to	+30	days),	it	was	found	that	shareholders	of	the	acquiring	firms	experienced	cumulative	abnormal	returns	that	were	of	a	higher	magnitude	during	the	short-term	event	window.	Possible	explanations	for	this	could	be	that	over	a	longer	period	of	time,	investors’	confidence	about	the	expected	value	generated	by	the	deal	decreases.		Another	conclusion	drawn	from	the	analysis	of	data	is	there	are	characteristics	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	that	are	related	to	the	deal’s	performance.	This	thesis	examined	two	of	those	characteristics:	transaction	value	and	industry.	Transaction	value	had	a	significant,	negative	correlation	with	cumulative	abnormal	returns	indicating	that	as	transaction	value	increases,	cumulative	abnormal	returns	were	likely	to	become	more	negative.	Furthermore,	it	was	concluded	that	company	industry	did	not	have	any	significant	correlation	with	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	
B. Limitations	of	Research	This	thesis	examines	the	value	generated	resulting	from	a	merger	or	acquisition	announced	between	2005	and	2009	involving	US	firms.	It	focuses	primarily	on	the	market’s	reaction	to	the	announcement	and	consequently	how	shareholders	are	impacted.	While	this	is	indicative	of	what	investors	believe	the	expected	value	will	be	resulting	from	the	deal,	there	are	multiple	other	stakeholders	affected	by	a	merger	or	acquisition.	Possible	stakeholders	include	employees	of	the	firms	and	customers.	This	thesis	neglects	to	evaluate	the	value	returned	to	these	groups,	and	is	thus	not	a	complete	analysis	of	the	deal’s	performance.		
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	 Furthermore,	this	thesis	evaluated	50	US	mergers	and	acquisitions	that	occurred	between	2005	and	2009.	There	are	two	implications	of	the	sample	used:	size	and	time	period.	First,	the	sample	size	was	very	small,	and	therefore	may	not	accurately	represent	the	wealth	effects	of	the	population	of	mergers	and	acquisitions.	In	addition,	it	can	be	more	difficult	to	detect	significance	in	a	sample	when	it	is	small.	This	could	result	in	significant	differences	among	the	data	going	unnoticed.	In	addition	to	the	size	of	the	sample,	the	time	period	from	which	the	data	was	collected	likely	has	implications.	The	time	period	2005-2009	was	chosen	based	on	the	lack	of	available	data	for	the	analysis,	but	includes	the	financial	crisis	of	2008,	which	had	substantial	and	widespread	detrimental	effects	on	the	stock	market.	While	it	can	be	assumed	that	all	companies	in	the	sample	were	negatively	impacted	by	the	financial	crisis,	there	are	some	industries	that	were	likely	affected	more	than	others.	It	is	difficult	to	control	for	these	confounding	effects,	which	may	have	skewed	the	data	in	a	particular	direction.		
C. Suggestions	for	Future	Research	There	are	multiple	possible	avenues	for	future	merger	and	acquisition	research.	One	possible	approach	would	be	to	evaluate	the	value	generated	from	a	deal	through	multiple	event	windows.	This	thesis	looked	at	an	immediate	window	and	a	short-term	window	centered	around	the	deal	announcement,	and	found	a	substantial	difference	in	the	returns	realized	by	shareholders.	It	would	be	valuable	to	examine	this	variance	more	carefully,	and	expand	it	to	other	event	windows	as	well	to	identify	what	factors	drive	the	differences	in	value	created	
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over	varied	time	periods.		Another	potential	avenue	for	future	research	would	be	to	examine	the	effects	of	mergers	and	acquisitions	in	different	countries.	This	thesis	limited	the	sample	to	include	only	deals	involving	US	companies,	but	it	could	be	interesting	to	determine	if	the	value	generated	by	deals	varies	across	countries	as	a	result	of	regulation,	investor	perceptions,	or	other	reasons.	A	final	suggestion	for	future	research	involves	broadening	the	value	analysis	to	groups	other	than	shareholders.	This	could	provide	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	how	mergers	and	acquisitions	impact	different	stakeholders,	and	provide	a	more	thorough	examination	of	the	value	generated	by	mergers	and	acquisitions.	
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Table	2:	CAR	for	Immediate	Event	Window		
	
	
Company CAR T-Statistic
Procter	&	Gamble	Co -6.592% -3.500**
SBC	Communications	Inc -1.430% -0.3181
Boston	Scientific	Corp -1.253% -0.247
Duke	Energy	Corp -5.694% -1.994**
Federated	Department	Stores	(M) 5.394% 0.694
ChevronTexaco	Corp -2.414% -0.361
Bank	of	America	Corp -4.113% -1.632
MetLife	Inc -3.469% -1.598
Verizon	Communications	Inc -0.546% -0.895
Cisco	Systems	Inc -2.393% -0.908
Boeing	Co 0.345% 0.135
Capital	One	Financial	Corp -5.356% -0.551
Thermo	Electron	Corp -2.036% -0.665
Motorola	Inc 3.984% 2.191**
Home	Depot	Inc 4.842% 1.61
Bank	of	America	Corp -0.858% -0.908
Johnson	&	Johnson -4.059% -2.326**
Rite	Aid	Corp -4.168% -0.321
Walt	Disney	Co -3.932% -1.184
CVS	Corp -8.299% -1.151
Coca-Cola	Co 2.549% 2.183**
Transocean	Inc 8.599% 1.802*
National	Oilwell	Varco	Inc -5.795% -0.699
Oracle	Corp -2.657% -0.987
Microsoft	Corp -1.970% -1.212
Bank	of	America	Corp -2.563% -1.467
Cisco	Systems	Inc 0.643% 0.365
UnitedHealth	Group	Inc -0.638% -0.229
IHOP	Corp 12.853% 1.512
Berkshire	Hathaway	Inc 3.535% 1.078
Hewlett	Packard	Co -6.559% -0.731
The	JM	Smucker	Co -0.264% -0.085
The	Dow	Chemical	Co -6.895% -1.436
CVS	Health	Corp 0.011% 0.005
CME	Group	Inc -5.052% -0.923
International	Paper	Co -14.759% -1.455
Boston	Properties	Inc -0.470% -0.199
Wells	Fargo	&	Co 20.842% 2.361**
Brocade	Commun	Sys	Inc -25.954% -1.116
Verizon	Wireless	Inc 2.179% 0.486
Oracle	Corp 3.971% 1.113
DirecTV	Group	Inc	(ATT) 0.581% 0.377
MetLife	Inc -11.400% -8.581**
Exxon	Mobil	Corp -7.042% -1.564
Comcast	Corp 16.778% 1.931*
Simon	Property	Group	Inc 0.972% 0.216
Walt	Disney	Co -2.704% -0.976
Xerox	Corp -17.273% -0.995
Pfizer	Inc -16.278% -1.473
Express	Scripts	Inc 18.211% 1.044
Average	CAR	for	Sample -1.572%
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Table	3:	CAR	for	Short-Term	Event	Window	
Company CAR T-Statistic 
Procter & Gamble Co 2.259% 0.326 
SBC Communications Inc -5.810% -0.999 
Boston Scientific Corp 8.782% 0.719 
Duke Energy Corp -2.081% -0.34 
Federated Dept. Stores 1.108% 0.092 
ChevronTexaco Corp -2.118% -0.193 
Bank of America Corp -11.528% -2.441** 
MetLife Inc -1.690% -0.231 
Verizon Communications Inc -9.565% -1.379 
Cisco Systems Inc 4.296% 0.506 
Boeing Co 1.835% 0.215 
Capital One Financial Corp -0.981% -0.084 
Thermo Electron Corp -12.542% -1.65* 
Motorola Inc -1.923% -0.179 
Home Depot Inc 3.465% 0.419 
Bank of America Corp -10.434% -2.184** 
Johnson & Johnson 14.104% 2.532** 
Rite Aid Corp -17.201% -0.918 
Walt Disney Co 14.240% 1.339 
CVS Corp -34.122% -1.981** 
Coca-Cola Co 3.225% 0.685 
Transocean Inc 3.708% 0.289 
National Oilwell Varco Inc -35.346% -1.407 
Oracle Corp 3.375% 0.26 
Microsoft Corp 3.812% 0.646 
Bank of America Corp -0.357% -0.072 
Cisco Systems Inc -11.020% -1.46 
UnitedHealth Group Inc 9.636% 0.909 
IHOP Corp 10.069% 0.718 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc 0.680% 0.054 
Hewlett Packard Co 6.009% 0.531 
The JM Smucker Co -8.721% -0.67 
The Dow Chemical Co -17.139% -1.739 
CVS Health Corp -16.659% -1.548 
CME Group Inc -25.498% -1.052 
International Paper Co -11.688% -0.744 
Boston Properties Inc -5.641% -0.509 
Wells Fargo & Co 67.610% 1.884* 
Brocade Commun Sys Inc -12.588% -0.424 
Verizon Wireless Inc 20.169% 2.186** 
Oracle Corp -2.752% -0.165 
DirecTV Group Inc -19.188% -1.851* 
MetLife Inc -24.917% -1.674* 
Exxon Mobil Corp -0.577% -0.087 
Comcast Corp -2.788% -0.199 
Simon Property Group Inc -4.654% -0.356 
Walt Disney Co -9.929% -0.975 
Xerox Corp -34.209% -1.547 
Pfizer Inc -23.881% -1.467 
Express Scripts Inc 3.932% 0.154 
Average CAR for Sample  -3.905%   
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Table	4:	Regression	Analysis	of	CAR	for	Immediate	Event	Window		
														 	
	
Table	5:	Regression	Analysis	of	CAR	for	Short-Term	Event	Window	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Variable	 Coefficient	 	
		
	
		
Constant	 -0.0157	
	
		
																					(0.012)	
	 		
Observations	 50	 		
R-squared	 0.000	 		
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1		
		 		 		
Variable		 Coefficient	 	
		 	 		
Constant	 -0.0390	 	
		
																					(0.0229)	
	 		
Observations	 50	 		
R-squared	 0.000	 		
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	 		
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 		 			
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Table	6:	Differences	in	CAR	by	Transaction	Value	
					
	
	
	
	
		 Company	
Transaction	
Value	 CAR	 T-Statistic	
PANEL	A	 		 		 		 		
		 IHOP	Corp	 1,931.602	 12.853%	 1.511	
		 Boeing	Co	 2,057.10	 0.345%	 0.135	
		 Simon	Property	Group	Inc	 2,325.00	 0.972%	 0.216	
		 Brocade	Commun	Sys	Inc	 2,410.448	 -25.954%	 -1.116	
		 UnitedHealth	Group	Inc	 2,425.343	 -0.638%	 -0.229	
		 CVS	Health	Corp	 2,637.421	 0.011%	 0.005	
		 Cisco	Systems	Inc	 3,090.519	 0.643%	 0.365	
		 Bank	of	America	Corp	 3,300.00	 -0.858%	 -0.908	
		 The	JM	Smucker	Co	 3,300.00	 -0.264%	 -0.085	
		 Rite	Aid	Corp	 3,470.00	 -4.168%	 -0.321	
PANEL	B	 		 		 		 		
		 Home	Depot	Inc	 3,475.355	 4.842%	 1.61	
		 Motorola	Inc	 3,880.468	 3.984%	 2.191**	
		 Boston	Properties	Inc	 3,949.00	 -0.470%	 -0.199	
		 Walt	Disney	Co	 3,958.354	 -2.704%	 -0.976	
		 Coca-Cola	Co	 4,100.00	 2.549%	 2.183**	
		 Berkshire	Hathaway	Inc	 4,500.00	 3.535%	 1.078	
		 Express	Scripts	Inc	 4,675.00	 18.211%	 1.044	
		 International	Paper	Co	 6,000.00	 -14.759%	 -1.455	
		 Microsoft	Corp	 6,333.117	 -1.970%	 -1.212	
		 Cisco	Systems	Inc	 6,865.722	 -2.393%	 -0.908	
PANEL	C	 		 		 		 		
		 Oracle	Corp	 7,305.203	 3.971%	 1.113	
		 National	Oilwell	Varco	Inc	 7,513.454	 -5.795%	 -0.699	
		 Walt	Disney	Co	 7,531.739	 -3.932%	 -1.184	
		 CME	Group	Inc	 7,555.372	 -5.052%	 -0.923	
		 Oracle	Corp	 8,056.049	 -2.657%	 -0.987	
		 Xerox	Corp	 8,374.197	 -17.273%	 -0.995	
		 Verizon	Communications	 8,495.595	 -0.546%	 -0.895	
		 Duke	Energy	Corp	 8,832.943	 -5.694%	 -1.994**	
		 Thermo	Electron	Corp	 10,291.785	 -2.036%	 -0.665	
		 MetLife	Inc	 11,694.656	 -3.469%	 -1.598		
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Table	7:		Differences	in	CAR	by	Transaction	Value	(contd.)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		 Company	
Transaction	
Value	 CAR	 T-Statistic	
PANEL	D	 		 		 		 		
		 Hewlett	Packard	Co	 12,565.034	 -6.559%	 -0.731	
		 SBC	Communications	Inc	 14,732.64	 -1.430%	 -0.318	
		 Wells	Fargo	&	Co	 15,112.754	 20.842%	 2.361**	
		 Capital	One	Financial	Corp	 15,132.87	 -5.356%	 -0.551	
		 DirecTV	Group	Inc	(ATT)	 15,243.05	 0.581%	 0.377	
		 The	Dow	Chemical	Co	 15,513.132	 -6.895%	 -1.436	
		 MetLife	Inc	 15,543.544	 -11.400%	 -8.581**	
		 Federated	Department	Stores		 16,465.871	 5.394%	 0.694	
		 Johnson	&	Johnson	 16,600.00	 -4.059%	 -2.326**	
		 Transocean	Inc	 17,298.661	 8.599%	 1.802*	
PANEL	E	 		 		 		 		
		 ChevronTexaco	Corp	 18,718.509	 -2.414%	 -0.361	
		 Bank	of	America	Corp	 21,000.00	 -2.563%	 -1.467	
		 Comcast	Corp	 23,500.00	 16.778%	 1.931*	
		 CVS	Corp	 26,293.576	 -8.299%	 -1.151	
		 Boston	Scientific	Corp	 27,861.289	 -1.253%	 -0.247	
		 Verizon	Wireless	Inc	 28,100.00	 2.179%	 0.486	
		 Bank	of	America	Corp	 35,810.268	 -4.113%	 -1.632	
		 Exxon	Mobil	Corp	 40,298.142	 -7.042%	 -1.564	
		 Procter	&	Gamble	Co	 54,906.807	 -6.592%	 -3.500**	
		 Pfizer	Inc	 67,285.695	 -16.278%	 -1.473		
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Table	8:	Regression	Analysis	of	Transaction	Value		
	
	
Table	9:	Differences	in	CAR	by	Industry	
	
	
	
	
	
	 		 		
Variables	 Coefficient	 	
		 	 		
Transaction	Value	 -0.0013*	 	
		
(0.001)	
	 		
Constant	 0.0011	 	
		
(0.016)	
	 		
Observations	 50	 		
R-squared	 0.043	 		
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	 		
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	 		 			
Company Industry CAR T-Statistic
CVS Health Corp Consumer Retail 0.011% 0.005
The JM Smucker Group Consumer Retail -0.264% -0.085
Rite Aid Corp Consumer Retail -4.168% -0.321
Home Depot Inc Consumer Retail 4.842% 1.61
Coca-Cola Inc Consumer Retail 2.549% 2.183**
International Paper Co Consumer Retail -14.759% -1.455
Federated Dept. Stores Consumer Retail 5.394% 0.694
CVS Corp Consumer Retail -8.299% -1.151
Proctor & Gamble Co Consumer Retail -6.592% -3.5**
National Oilwell Varco Inc Energy Service -5.795% -0.699
Duke Energy Corp Energy Service -5.694% -1.994**
Transocean Inc Energy Service 8.599% 1.802*
Chevron Texaco Corp Energy Service -2.414% -0.361
Exxon Mobil Corp Energy Service -7.042% -1.564
UnitedHealth Group Inc Health Care/Life Sciences -0.638% -0.229
Express Scripts Inc Health Care/Life Sciences 18.211% 1.044
Thermo Electron Corp Health Care/Life Sciences -2.036% -0.665
Johnson & Johnson Health Care/Life Sciences -4.059% -2.326**
Boston Scientific Corp Health Care/Life Sciences -1.253% -0.247
Pfizer Inc Health Care/Life Sciences -16.278% -1.473
Boeing Co Industrial Goods 0.345% 0.135
The Dow Chemical Co Industrial Goods -6.895% -1.436
IHOP Corp Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure 12.853% 1.512
Simon Property Group Inc Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure 0.972% 0.216
Boston Properties Inc Real Estate/Gaming/Lesiure -0.470% -0.199
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Table	10:	Differences	in	CAR	by	Industry	(contd.)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Company Industry CAR T-Statistic 
Bank of America Corp Financial Services -0.858% -0.908 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc Financial Services 3.535% 1.078 
CME Group Inc Financial Services -5.052% -0.923 
MetLife Inc Financial Services -3.469% -1.598 
Wells Fargo & Co Financial Services 20.842% 2.361** 
Capital One Financial Corp Financial Services -5.356% -0.551 
MetLife Inc Financial Services -11.400% -8.58** 
Bank of America Corp Financial Services -2.563% -1.467 
Bank of America Corp Financial Services -4.113% -1.632 
Brocade Commun Sys Inc Technology/Media/Telecom -25.954% -1.116 
Cisco Systems Inc Technology/Media/Telecom 0.643% 0.365 
Motorola Inc Technology/Media/Telecom 3.984% 2.191** 
Walt Disney Co Technology/Media/Telecom -2.704% -0.976 
Microsoft Corp Technology/Media/Telecom -1.970% -1.212 
Cisco Systems Inc Technology/Media/Telecom -2.393% -0.908 
Oracle Corp Technology/Media/Telecom 3.971% 1.113 
Walt Disney Co Technology/Media/Telecom -3.932% -1.184 
Oracle Corp Technology/Media/Telecom -2.657% -0.987 
Xerox Corp Technology/Media/Telecom -17.273% -0.995 
Verizon Communications  Technology/Media/Telecom -0.546% -0.895 
Hewlett Packard Co Technology/Media/Telecom -6.559% -0.731 
SBC Communications Inc Technology/Media/Telecom -1.430% -0.318 
DirecTV Group Inc Technology/Media/Telecom 0.581% 0.377 
Comcast Corp Technology/Media/Telecom 16.778% 1.931* 
Verizon Wireless Inc Technology/Media/Telecom 2.179% 0.486 	
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Table	11:	Regression	Analysis	of	Company	Industry	
	
	
	
											Figure	1:	Formal	Definition	of	Event	Study	Windows	
							 		
	
	
	
	
	
INDUSTRY Coefficient
Robust	Std.	
Error
	Energy	Service -0.001 0.0358
	Financial	Services 0.0143 0.0382
	Health	Care/Life	Sciences 0.0136 0.4992
Industrial	Goods -0.0091 0.0357
Real	Estate/Gaming/Leisure 0.0682 0.0435
Technology/Media/Telecommunications 0.0004 0.0331
Constant -0.0237 0.0226
Observations 50
R-squared 0.041
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Consumer	Retail	Industry	omitted	
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Figure	2:	Transaction	Value	vs.	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	
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